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Footprints of Death
In October 1999, ten-year-old Burim Jashari lost his left leg and
may lose his right one, as a result of an exploding cluster bomblet
in his village of Babushi Muhaxhereve, Kosovo. "Momma, can
you give me one of your legs?" he reportedly asked his mother
after the accident. Four other boys with whom he was tending
animals were also injured. Burim identified a picture of a U.S.
dropped cluster bomblet as the culprit.'
INTRODUCTION
Cluster bombs are indiscriminate weapons. The inherent nature of
cluster bombs as wide-area munitions, at a minimum, should make their
use illegal in civilian areas, as the risk of civilian casualties is prohibi-
tively high. Unexploded bomblets act as de facto landmines after initial
use, making them indiscriminate killers for decades to come. In light of
these characteristics, a moratorium on the use, production, trade, and
stockpiling of cluster bombs should be implemented immediately. This
moratorium should lead to banning their use, production, transfer and
stockpiling through international treaty.
While cluster bombs have not been banned explicitly under interna-
tional law,3 close scrutiny of their historical use through the lens of
established international humanitarian law supports the argument that they
should be. Principles of discrimination (those norms which call on mili-
tary forces to distinguish between civilian and military targets and to limit
damage to civilians) have been firmly enshrined in international humani-
tarian law. Cluster bombs can be shown to be geographically
indiscriminate in nature, when used in areas of civilian concentration.
Cluster munitions have large "footprints" (the surface area where
bomblets are dispersed), and most versions are difficult to accurately tar-
get, making their use especially problematic in civilian areas. Cluster
1. Thane Burnett, Burim's Story: Young Victim of Deadly Dregs of War, TORONTO
SUN, Dec. 5, 1999, at 62.
2. Unexploded bomblets and submunitions are often referred to as "duds." This termi-
nology is somewhat misleading, as the word "dud" suggests that such a bomblet not only has
not but will not explode. Duds which fail to explode on initial contact often do explode when
disturbed at a later time.
3. The Ottawa Mines Ban Treaty, with its design-focused definition of landmines (as
opposed to a definition focused on the actual effects of particular weapons), most likely
excludes cluster bombs from its coverage. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-
piling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Dec. 3,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter Mines Ban Treaty, or MBT]. The MBT defines an anti-
personnel landmine as "a mine designed to be exploded by the presence or contact of a per-
son and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons." Id. at Art. 2, 1. For
discussion of this issue, see infra Parts III.D & V.A.2.
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munitions can also be shown to be temporally indiscriminate, as their high
initial misfire rates combined with their small size convert them into de
facto landmines. These cumulative characteristics of cluster bombs make
them inherently indiscriminate and outweigh their military utility.
Militaries see cluster bombs as more effective against personnel, ar-
mored vehicles, and lightly protected buildings than unitary bombs
because of their wide area coverage. When access to precision guided
munitions fitted with unitary warheads is limited, militaries of both the
powerful and less powerful states wish not to restrict their weaponry op-
tions. Thus far, these "military utility" arguments in favor of using cluster
munitions have trumped humanitarian concerns.
This Article applies these principles of discrimination to the real,
rather than idealized, use and characteristics of cluster bombs. Briefly
stated, these principles call upon parties to an armed conflict to distin-
guish between civilians and combatants and to weigh the military
advantages of a particular weapon or type of attack against the harm it
will do to civilians and civilian objects.4 This Article also considers briefly
the global problem of cluster munitions and examines fundamental com-
ponents of the discrimination principle as they apply to cluster bombs. As
three specific case studies, it analyzes the use of cluster bombs by
breakaway Serbs in Croatia in 1995, by NATO in the bombing campaign
of 1999 in Serbia and Kosovo, and by Russia in the breakaway republic of
Chechnya in 1994-96 and again in the renewal of the conflict beginning
in late 1999. These case studies illustrate that the restraint of international
humanitarian law has been insufficient to mitigate the well documented
harm that ravages communities for months, years, and even decades after
a conflict ends. Also examined are past efforts to ban or restrict the use of
cluster bombs to discover whether lessons learned from the past can be
helpful in current discussions concerning cluster bombs.
The international community should ban the use of cluster munitions,
or, at the very least, sharply restrict their use to non-civilian areas and
impose obligations on the users of cluster bombs related to unexploded
bomblets. While a ban is under consideration, concerned states should
take a lead in calling for a moratorium. While an imperfect instrument, the
five year review conference of the Conventional Weapons Treaty5
provides the most hopeful forum for the creation of new rules.
4. See infra Part III for a detailed description of the discrimination principle. The dis-
crimination principle primarily concerns itself with harm to civilian persons and objects.
While tenable arguments against the use of cluster bombs can be made under a related inter-
national law principle prohibiting superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering against both
civilian and military personnel, this paper focuses on discrimination principles.
5. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
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I. WHAT ARE CLUSTER BOMBS AND WHY Do MILITARIES
WANT THEM IN THEIR ARSENALS?
Loosely defined, cluster munitions are weapons systems that dis-
perse a large number of small explosive bomblets (or "submunitions")
over a large area, as opposed to unitary or single warhead bombs, which
strike a single point. A useful comparison may be the difference be-
tween a shotgun blast and a rifle. A cluster bomb "shotgun" delivers
hundreds of small exploding bomblets to a target. Each bomblet, in turn,
showers a radius of up to 150 meters with shrapnel and or steel pellets.
A unitary bomb "rifle" fires a single, much larger "bullet" at a target.
While the term "cluster bomb" suggests that these weapons are al-
ways dropped by aircraft, cluster bombs can also be delivered by
artillery, missiles and rockets. When dropped from the air, each cluster
munition usually consists of a large container (often referred to as a
"tactical munitions dispenser," or TMD) packed with several hundred
bomblets (also referred to as "submunitions"). Artillery shells or rocket
warheads can also be packed with bomblets,6 as can cruise missile war-
heads . Upon reaching a target, the dispensers or larger shells open as a
result of a small explosive charge, dispersing their bomblets over the
target area. The area they cover is normally referred to as an elliptical
"footprint." Footprints can be as large as 350 meters by 500 meters.
8
Heavy bombers can carry as many as 40 tactical munitions dispensers.9
Bomblets are quite small, with shapes and sizes resembling hockey
pucks, tennis balls and soda cans. They are often brightly colored.
Bomblets are armed in their descent, with their detonating fuzes usually
Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137-255 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Treaty,
or CCW].
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-60: TACTICS, TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES FOR MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) OPERATIONS 3-2 (1996)
[hereinafter MLRS FIELD MANUAL 1996], available at http://sill-www.army.mil/FACCC.
7. David C. Isby, Tochka Upgrade Announced, JANE'S MISSILES & ROCKETS, Dec. 1,
1999, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications File.
8. For additional technical information on air-dropped, artillery, and missile launched
cluster munitions in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, see Virgil Wiebe & Titus Peachey, Clus-
ters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Global Report on Cluster Bomb
Production and Use, (July 2000) [hereinafter Wiebe & Peachey, Clusters of Death] avail-
able at http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/report/index.htm. In July 2000, NATO reported to
British Parliamentarians that they considered one square kilometer to be a safe estimation of
cluster bomb footprints from NATO ordnance in Kosovo. THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY
LANDMINE ERADICATION GROUP, U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS, CLUSTER MUNITIONS: NOTE OF
MEETING WITH NATO, para. 5 (July 24, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter PARLIA-
MENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING].
9. See, e.g, Paul F. Walker & Eric Stambler, And Those Dirty Little Weapons,
BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, May 1991, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1991/may 9 l/
may91 walker.html (explaining that a B-52 bomber can carry 40 cluster bombs).
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being activated as a result of rapid spinning. Upon impact, they are in-
tended to explode, showering a radius of up to a 150 meters with
shrapnel and ball bearings. Many are designed to be "dual purpose," i.e.,
to be both anti-personnel and anti-materiel. Such bomblets generally
have both shrapnel and "shaped charges," which are intended to bum
through armored vehicles and tanks.' Some bomblets, referred to in the
U.S. arsenal as "combined effects munitions," pack an additional incen-
diary punch when the explosive charge includes materials like
zirconium, a metal which bums at extreme temperatures when ignited.
More advanced "smart" submunitions contain infra-red heat-seeking
and acoustic sensors to target the engines of vehicles."
Finally, an additional and well-documented effect of bomblets is
their conversion into de facto landmines when they fail to explode on
contact. Often, the slightest touch can result in their explosion. Person-
nel charged with cleaning up unexploded ordnance recognize that areas
saturated with cluster munitions are defacto minefields. 2
The combined effects nature of the weapon, in conjunction with its
wide area coverage and shotgun like nature, are attractive features to a
military seeking to kill large numbers of troops and disable multiple
armored vehicles in open areas. When targeting capabilities for a single
large bomb are limited, one's chances of hitting a target are magnified
when there are, for instance, 202 little chances (bomblets) to hit a target
rather than one big chance (a single large unitary warhead). Addition-
10. See, e.g., Edmond Dantes, CBU-87 Combined Effects Munition: The Pilot's Weapon
of Choice, ASIAN DEFENCE. J., Mar. 1991, at 82.
11. McGrath, a former British military officer and founder of a non-profit ordnance
clearance organization, refers to four categories of cluster submunitions: Anti-personnel,
Anti -tank/anti-materiel, Combined-effects Munitions (CEMs), and Landmines. Many cluster
munitions systems are able to dispense conventional antipersonnel and anti-tank landmines
as well as cluster bomblets. RAE MCGRATH, CLUSTER BOMBS: THE MILITARY EFFECTIVE-
NESS & IMPACT ON CIVILIANS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS 18-23 (2000). Colin King, editor of
the prestigious Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, categorizes cluster submunitions accord-
ing to their fuzing: Simple Stabilized (those designed to impact their targeted at a set angle
and stabilized in flight through fins or parachutes-includes most dual purpose and CEMs),
Spin-Armed (spherical or ovoid submunitions whose fuzes are armed by spinning-
generally these are anti-personnel), Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions
(DPICM)(stabilized and armed by a streamer) and Smart submunitions. COLIN KING, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, SUBMUNITIONS AND OTHER UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE, A STUDY:
EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR 32-34 (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter ICRC,
SUBMUNITIONS].
12. Thane Burnett, Kosovo's Legacy: Serbian Landmines and NATO Cluster Bomblets,
TORONTO SUN, Dec. 5, 1999, at 60. Canadian deminer, Major Kris Stec, in referring to Brit-
ish & U.S. cluster bombs dropped in Kosovo, stated, "They're not technically a landmine but
they do the same job when they're sitting on the ground .... They've been our biggest haz-
ard." Jasper Harrison, with the German-based demining agency HELP concurs, saying,
"They act like a mine, to a farmer or a child who steps on it, there's no real difference." Id.
[Vol. 22:85
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ally, cluster bombs increase the ability -to hit multiple targets, such as
massed troops or a concentration of tanks.'3
That cluster munitions play a key role in strategic and tactical plan-
ning for future conflicts can be seen in the U.S. Department of
Defense's 2000 Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Up-
grades to the U.S. bomber fleet, making it capable of carrying advanced
cluster munitions, are highlighted in the report. The U.S. Air Force her-
alds the development of improved guidance systems for cluster
munitions, and the U.S. Army highlights the central role that improved
ground based cluster munitions systems play in force composition. 14
II. WHERE HAVE CLUSTER BOMBS BEEN PRODUCED AND USED?
Cluster bombs have come into increasing use in the past sixty years.
The first uses were by the Soviets and Germans during World War HI5
The U.S. military has employed them extensively in nearly every major
conflict since the Vietnam War. From 1964 to 1973, Laos endured one of
the most intensive bombing campaigns in modem history, as the United
States attempted to destroy the social and economic infrastructure of the
Pathet Lao communist forces. Over 500,000 bombing missions occurred,
dropping over two million tons of ordnance. In Xieng Khouang province
alone, one of the most heavily bombed areas, an estimated 300,000 tons of
bombs were dropped (an average of more than two tons per inhabitant). A
1971 U.S. Information Service refugee survey found that at least 80% of
the victims were civilians.
6
In the first five years following the end of the war, over 4,500 people
were killed or injured by unexploded ordnance, according to surveys re-
cently conducted. For the entire period between 1973 and 1996, at least
11,000 people were killed or injured. Estimates are that at least half of
13. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: KoSOVO/OPERATION AL-
LIED FORCE AFTER-ACTION REPORT 90 (2000), available at http://call.army.mil/
callhomepage/spc-prod.htm [hereinafter Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT].
14. WILLIAM S. COHEN, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 54-
57, 65-66, 201 (2000), available at http://www.ddn.com/reports/adr2000.pdf.
15. King, supra note 11, at 10-11.
16. Bruce Shoemaker, Legacy of the Secret War: The Continuing Problem of Unex-
ploded Ordnance in Xieng Khouang Province, Laos, and the Response of the Mennonite
Central Committee and the American Friends Service Committee, 1972-1994 (1994), at
http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb; see also Lao National UXO Programme, Workplan 1999
(1999) [hereinafter Lao UXO, Workplan 1999], available at http://www.undp.org/erd/
devinitiatives/mineaction/laos/ (last modified October 18, 1999). Considerable protest was
made during the war due to the high rate of civilian casualties during the actual use of cluster
munitions. See, e.g., ERIC PROKOSCH, THE TECHNOLOGY OF KILLING: A MILITARY & PO-
LITICAL HISTORY OF ANTIPERSONNEL WEAPONS 93-98 (1995).
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those casualties were caused by cluster submunitions. Injuries and deaths
continue to the present day. According to data collected in 1998, the per-
centage of child victims is on the rise. Forty percent of unexploded
ordnance victims are killed outright. Sixteen of Laos' provinces are af-
fected by unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 25% of the country's villages
remain severely contaminated.'7 Since the end of the war, numerous ef-
forts have been undertaken to clear land and living area of UXO.'8
Ordnance experts estimate that between nine and twenty-seven mil-
lion unexploded cluster bomblets remain in the ground in Laos.9
Currently, UXO clearance, training, and community awareness activities
are being conducted by five international mine clearance organizations
and military advisors from the United States and Belgium. 20 From 1996-
98, over 122,000 pieces of UXO were cleared, with approximately 50-
75% of that total being cluster bomblets.2' In 1999, 41,000 cluster
bomblets were cleared, with another estimated 50,000 cleared in the year
2000.22 Manufacturers estimated a ten percent failure rate for the cluster
bomblets used, "but it is now generally agreed that the actual rate was
30% because the ordnance was often not dropped in accordance with
manufacturer specifications. 23
The United States also heavily employed cluster munitions during the
Gulf War. During Desert Storm the U.S. Air Force dropped 47,167 cluster
munitions, carrying 13,167,544 submunitions.' The U.S. Army also fired
17. Lao UXO, Workplan 1999, supra note 16. Farmers and gatherers of forest products
constitute a large proportion of casualties, as do those attempting to salvage munitions for
scrap metal. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT TO THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE 2001 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE CCW
AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR 5 (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter ICRC, 2000
CCW REPORT].
18. For a summary of early efforts, see Shoemaker, supra note 16.
19. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 31; ICRC, 2000 CCW REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.
20. Lao UXO, Workplan 1999, supra note 16.
21. Id.
22. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING ON EXPLOSIVE
REMNANTS OF WAR: A SUMMARY REPORT 8 (2000) [hereinafter ICRC, NYON SUMMARY
REPORT]. At this rate, assuming 9 million unexploded bomblets, it will take 180 years to
clear Laos of cluster bomb UXO, or 540 years assuming 27 million.
23. Draft Agreement for the U.N. Dev. Program Trust Fund, Nationwide Unexploded
Ordnance Clearance Initiative Lao PDR, Apr. 19, 1995, at 1 (on file with author); see also
Lao UXO, Workplan 1999, supra note 16.
24. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 33, (citing U.S. General Accounting Office, Desert
Storm Analysis, Dec. 12, 1997, GAO/NSAID-978-134, Table IV.4).
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17,286 MLRS rockets, scattering an additional 11,130,000 submunitions.25
Of the air-dropped bombs, 10,035 were CBU-87s.26
[T]he. CBU-87/B, was described by air force officials as the
weapon of choice in the Middle East. This "combined effects
munition" carries 202 bomblets, the BLU-97/B. Each 3.4-pound
bomblet carries a triple punch: a prefragmented antipersonnel
casing to spray deadly shrapnel; a hollow-charge antitank war-
head; and a disc of incendiary zirconium to add a fiery finishing
touch. The air force claims one such bomblet will disable heavy
vehicles over a 50-foot radius and aircraft over a 250-foot ra-
dius. Troops would be still more vulnerable at greater ranges.
A single B-52 strategic bomber can carry 40 such cluster
bombs, with a total of 8,080 bomblets. Theoretically, assuming
a danger radius of 250 feet, one B-52 could carpet-bomb over
176 million square yards, equal to 27,500 football fields. The 28
B-52s which reportedly dropped 470 tons of explosives on Iraqi
ground forces on one day, January 30, [1991] could have oblit-
erated 1,600 square miles, an area one-third the size of
Connecticut.27
United States soldiers estimated that the dud rate for cluster muni-
tions used in the Gulf War was between 10-20%, well above the
"acceptable" level of 3-5%.28 Human Rights Watch has cited reports
noting dud rates of as high as 30% during the Gulf War.29
Lest one get the impression that only the United States has used
cluster bombs extensively, a few additional examples are in order.
Cluster munitions have been employed worldwide, used by state and
non-state actors in places as diverse as the Afghanistan, Angola,
Chechnya, Croatia, the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Kashmir, Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and
Vietnam. °
25. Id. at 40.
26. Federation of American Scientists, FAS: Military Analysis Network, at
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/cbu-87.htm (last modified March 15, 2001).
27. Walker & Stambler, supra note 9.
28. Thomas Williams & Karen Wagner, GAO to Study Army's Use of Cluster Bombs in
Gulf War, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 5, 1992, at A3; Thomas Williams & Karen Wagner,
Look of Innocence Hides Lethal Military Killer, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 21, 1991, at A8.
29. Human Rights Watch, Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in
Yugoslavia, Vol. 11, No. 6(d), June 1999, at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/nato2/
index.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Ticking Time
Bombs].
30. See, e.g., Army Reportedly Seizes Areas from UNITA, BBC MONITORING AFRICA,
June 16, 2000 (Angolan government troops seize a Ukrainian-made Uragan multiple rocket
Fall 2000]
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Contractors from around the globe produce cluster bombs, multiple
rocket launcher systems, submunitions, and their components. A non-
exclusive list includes manufacturers in Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China,
the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, India, Israel, Italy, Germany, North
Korea, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.31
launch system from UNITA), available at LEXIS, All News, BBC Worldwide Monitoring
File; Azeris, Armenians Report Heavy Fighting, TASS (Moscow/Baku/Yerevan), July 22,
1993 (Azerbaijani planes drop cluster bombs outside Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh); Joel
Brand, Rockets Strike at Zagreb Innocents, TIMES (London), May 4, 1995, at 15 (reporting a
cluster bomb attack on Zagreb, Croatia by Serb separatists); Stephen Brook, The Forgotten
War, TIMES (London), June 5, 1993, (girl killed by unexploded cluster bomb in Nagorno-
Karabakh); Fiachra Gibbons, Shot by Both Sides, GUARDIAN (London), May 25, 2000, at 12
(noting cluster bomb use by ECOMOG international peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone);
Lucy Hannon, Ethiopian MIGs Launch Raids on Eritrean Capital, INDEPENDENT (London),
May 30, 2000, at 11 (detailing an Ethiopian cluster bomb attack on Asmara); India Conducts
Airstrikes Against Kashmir Intruders for 13th Day, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (New Delhi),
June 8, 1999, available at LEXIS, All News, Agence France Presse File; Lebanese Civilian
Seriously Hurt by Israeli Fire, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Tyre), April 25, 2000, (civilian
wounded by Israeli cluster bomb likely dropped in 1982, available at LEXIS, All News,
Agence France Presse File; Sulaiman Momodu, Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL has Detonated
Hundreds of Rebel Bombs, AFRICA NEWS, June 6, 2000 (noting cluster bomb clearance in
Sierra Leone); King, supra note 11, at 14-16 (explaining use of the BL-755 by the British in
the Falkland Islands War in 1982); Anna Richardson, The Dogs Ate the Dead, the Living Ate
the Dogs, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 5, 1999 (Angolan government planes cluster bomb
UNITA positions); Three Children Killed By Bomb From China-Vietnam War, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (Hanoi) (reporting on three young children killed by a Vietnam-era cluster
bomb), June 16, 1999, available at LEXIS, All News, Agence France Presse File; U.N. De-
plores Taleban's Raids on Northern Afghanistan, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR (Islamabad),
Nov. 19, 1999 (detailing Taleban jet raids on the Bazarak area, killing internally displaced
persons), available at LEXIS, News Library, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (File); Karl Vick,
School Attack Shocks Ethiopians, WASH. POST, June 8, 1998, at Al (Eritrean planes bomb
Ethiopia, hitting an elementary school and killing 48 people); E-mail and e-mail attachment,
Summary of Incidents in Chechnya, from HALO Trust to Virgil Wiebe, Center for Applied
Legal Studies, Georgetown Law Center (May 10, 2000, 09:50 EST) (on file with author)
[hereinafter HALO Trust E-mail]; Mddecins Sans Frontires (Doctors Without Borders),
Living Under Aerial Bombardments: Report of an Investigation in the Province of Equato-
ria, Southern Sudan, (February 2000) available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/
documents/sdbomrap.pdf. For accounts of use in Iraq and Kosovo, see infra, Parts III.C &
IV.B.
31. See, e.g., JANE'S INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE DIRECTORY 961 (1996); W. Seth Carus,
Long Range Rocket Artillery in the Third World, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Oct. I 1991, at
471, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications File; Christopher F.
Foss, China's New 'Supergun' Artillery Could Hit Taiwan from Mainland, JANE'S DEFENCE
WKLY., Sept. 15, 1999, at 5, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publica-
tions File; Prasun K. Sengupta, MLRS Artillery for Area Saturation, ASIAN DEFENCE J., Oct.
1998, at 28; Bofors Defence, Website for Defence Industries-Army, Smart Mortar and
Artillery Ammunition, at http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/ammunition/bofors/
index.html (last modified February 23, 2001); SM Swiss Ammunition Enterprise Corp.,
Website for Defence Industries-Army, Shape Charged Warheads, Large/Small Caliber
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The Sudanese government routinely bombs the southern province of
Equatoria, often employing cluster bombs in targeting hospitals and
schools." In the conflict between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir in
mid-1999, India reportedly used air-dropped cluster bombs.33 Israel has
made repeated use of cluster bombs in southern Lebanon for decades in
its struggle against Hezbollah.3'
In addition to using cluster bombs extensively in Chechnya, dis-
cussed more fully below, Russia has been an active exporter of cluster
bomb systems. For example, the Russian Grad ("Hail") Multiple Launch
Rocket System, which can be equipped with cluster bomb warheads, has
been sold to over thirty-nine countries, including Afghanistan, Cambo-
dia, China, India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Vietnam.35
Non-state actors, such as UNITA in Angola, have also gotten into the
cluster bomb action, employing the Russian Uragan Multiple Rocket
Launch system.36
During the NATO air campaign from late March to early June of
1999, which was designed to stop Serbian forces from effecting ethnic
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, NATO warplanes and cruise missiles
dropped at least nearly 1800 cluster bombs on Kosovo and Serbia.37
Each bomb contained between 147 and 202 bomblets, leading to an es-
timate of over 300,000 submunitions dropped. Estimates of dud rates
Ammunition & Pyrotechnics, at http://www.army-technology.com/contractors/ammunition/
smswiss/index.html (last modified February 23, 2001).
32. See Wiebe & Peachey, Clusters of Death, supra note 8, at 79-88; MCGRATH, supra
note 11, at 38-39.
33. Rahul Bedi, India Steps Up Attacks, But Says Yes to Talks, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), June 1, 1999; Surinder Oberoi, India Accepts Talks with Pakistan or Kashmir but
Continues Offensive, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 8, 1999, available at LEXIS, All News,
Agence France Presse File. India also possesses short range ballistic missiles, most notably
the Prithvi, which can be fitted with cluster bomblet warheads. See, e.g., Centre for Defence
& International Security Studies, National Briefings: India, http://www.cdiss.org/
indiab.html (last modified May 11, 2000).
34. See, e.g., Jim Anderson, Washington News, UPI (Washington), July 2, 1982, avail-
able at LEXIS, All News, UPI File; Death Toll of Israeli Shelling Rises, Banned Bombs
Reportedly Used, Oct. 22, 1994 (Radio broadcast, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Beirut, Lebanon)).
35. Sengupta, supra note 31, at 28.
36. Id.
37. Jeffrey Fleishman, NATO's Attempts to Help Kosovars Blowing Up in Their Faces,
RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Nov. 25, 1999, at A17 (1100 U.S. cluster bombs and "about"
500 British cluster bombs deployed during Operation Allied Force). It was not until Novem-
ber 2000 that the Dutch government publicly acknowledged dropping 165 CBU-87s during
Operation Allied Force. F.H.G. Degrave (Minister of Defence) & J.J. van Artsen (Minister of
Foreign Affairs), Memorandum to the Chair of the Permanent Committee for Foreign Affairs
of the Lower House of the States-General, Subject: Cluster Bombs, Nov. 17, 2000, DVB/NN-
571/00 (Neth.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dutch Cluster Bomb Memorandum]. See
also infra note 175 and accompanying text.
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have varied from 5% (quoted by government officials) to over 30%
(estimated by clearance groups on the ground), 38 resulting in between
15,000 and 90,000 unexploded bomblets to be cleared.
III. CLUSTER BOMBS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Basic Principles of Discrimination
The characteristics of cluster bombs (namely their use in massive
numbers combined with their dud rates, and their wide-area nature) im-
plicate fundamental concerns of international humanitarian law. The
fundamental principle of discrimination, requiring that warfare should
be directed only at combatants, has been enshrined in international law.
The modern codification of the prohibition against indiscriminate
warfare finds its origins in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which
states that the "only legitimate object which states should endeavor to
38. RAE MCGRATH, KILLING SECRETS-THE U.K. CAMPAIGN FOR A TRANSPARENT AND
ACCOUNTABLE ARMS TRADE, A WASTELAND CALLED PEACE (May 1999) ("[T]he BL755 has
a probable design failure rate due to malfunctions as high as 5% which would increase sub-
stantially due to incorrect delivery."), available at http://www.icbl.org/resources/
raejune99.html (last modified June 3, 1999); W.F. Deedes, Sappers Seek the Deadly harvest
of NATO's Kosovo Cluster Bombs, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 20, 2000, at 23
(reporting a 10%-15% dud rate in Mitrovica); Carlotta Gall, Mines and NATO Bombs Still
Killing in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at A3 (quoting a HALO Trust engineer as es-
timating dud rates as high as 30%); John Henzell, NATO Bombs Continue to Kill, THE PRESS
(Christchurch), Jan. 24, 2000, at 7 (quoting John Flanagan, UNMACC Director, as finding a
Kosovo cluster bomb dud rate of 5%-30%); Ron Laurenzo, Cluster Bomb Dud Rates Cut,
Army Says, DEF. WEEK, June 1, 1999 (quoting Francis Kosakowski, Ogden Air Logistics
Center, Hill AFB, Utah as identifying a 12% "acceptable" dud rate for CBU-87 and a 5%-
7% "actual" dud rate); Rachel Stohl, Cluster Bombs Leave Lasting Legacy, WKLY. DEF.
MONITOR, at http://ww.cdi.org/weekly/1999/issue30.html#l (Aug. 5, 1999) (repeating 5%
rate); Letter from John M. McDuffie, Lieutenant General, U.S. Dep't of Def. Joint Staff to
Titus Peachey, Peace Education Director, Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) (Mar. 2,
2000) (on file with author) (citing a CBU-97 dud rate of "approximately 5%"); E-mail from
Patrick Channer, Deputy Programme Manager, U.N. Mines Action Coordination Centre
(UNMACC), to Titus Peachey, Peace Education Director, MCC (Feb. 26, 2000) (on file with
author) (citing Kosovo cluster bomb rate of "about 5%"); Interview by Titus Peachey, Di-
rector of Peace Education, MCC, with Leoni Barnes, UNMACC Staff Member (Dec. 16,
1999) (on file with author) (Kosovo bomb dud rate 8%-I1%); Human Rights Watch,
NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/
clus051 l.htm (May I1, 1999) (repeating the 5% rate); Human Rights Watch, supra note 29,
at 9 ("excessively high dud rate" during Gulf War); Serbia Info, 3,500 Cluster Bombs
Dropped Around Gracanica, at http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-04/18/11026.html
(Apr. 18, 2000) (citing a Serbian government source for a 20%-30% failure rate for a strike
near Gracanica Monastery).
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accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. 39
The first attempt to place such limits on air warfare can be found in the
1899 Hague Conventions, which prohibited for five years the launching
of projectiles or explosives from balloons or by similar new means. The
imprecise nature of bombing at the time justified such a ban under ex-
isting norms traditionally applied to ground warfare. This ban was
extended for five more years in 1907.40 That concern about imprecise
bombing has been at the heart of restrictions on aerial bombardment
since it inception should inform any efforts at regulating cluster bombs.
Following World War I and the debut of aerial bombardment, ef-
forts were made to codify rules of air warfare to minimize injury to
civilians and require aircraft to target, as much as possible, only military
objectives. The 1923 Rules of Air Warfare, drafted by a commission of
international jurists at the Hague, never became formal international law
but reflected reaction to aerial bombing in World War .' According to
paragraphs 3 & 4 of Article 24 of the draft Rules:
(3) The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildings not in the immediate neighbourhood of the operations
of land forces is prohibited. In cases where [military objectives]
are so situated, that they cannot be bombarded without the in-
discriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the
aircraft must abstain from bombardment.
(4) In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land
forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, and villages, dwell-
ings or buildings is legitimate provided there exists a reasonable
presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently im-
portant to justify such bombardment, having regard to the
danger thus caused to the civilian population.42
39. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29, 1868 (Dec. 11), 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (le ser.), re-
printed in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 49, 101 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds.,
3d rev. ed. 1988).
40. Javier Guisandez Gomez, The Law of Air Warfare, 323 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 347,
347-362 (1998), available at http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf. For the text of the treaties, see
Declaration [No. IV, 1] to Prohibit for the Term of Five Years the Launching of Projectiles
and Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1839, 1 Bevans 270; Declaration [No. XIV] Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, 1 Bevans 739.
41. Lt. Col. William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conven-
tional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 95 (1982).
42. Hague Rules of Air Warfare, drafted Dec. 1922-Feb. 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 39, at 207.
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Massive aerial bombardment and resulting staggering civilian casu-
alties during World War II severely tested the principle of distinction in
an age of "total war" and lack of clear rules. Hays Parks, one of the U.S.
military's leading authorities on the laws of armed conflict, has at-
tempted to summarize the state of affairs regarding the laws of armed
conflict at the conclusion of WWII. Certain "fundamental principles"
could be found interwoven in the bombing campaigns of the warring
parties: "[t]he intentional attack of the civilian population generally was
regarded as prohibited," but "collateral injury to the civilian population
or damage to civilian objects was the 'price of doing business' ";
"concern for collateral civilian casualties ... was regarded as a mutual
obligation shared by the attacker, defender, and the individual civilian,"
with the "primary responsibility ... rest[ing] squarely with the de-
fender"; and the attribution of civilian casualties to a myriad of factors,
including the intensity of enemy defenses, dispersal of targets, and
"their commingling with the civilian population as a natural conse-
quence of industrialization and urban growth." 3 The international
community responded to the horrors of World War II with the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, deemed by Parks to be "pragmatic and balanced," as
they distributed responsibility for limiting damage to protected persons
and places between the defender and attacker."
The next major recodification of international humanitarian law
came in the late 1970s. The basic principle protecting civilian popula-
tions in international conflict from indiscriminate attack and injury finds
articulation at Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions governing international armed conflicts, which
states:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against mili-
tary objectives.45
43. W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1990).
44. Id. at 55-59.
45. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S.(1977) 3-608 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. While not a signatory to the
Additional Protocols, the U.S. has generally agreed that the core principles concerning dis-
crimination have reached the status of customary international law and has pledged to adhere
to them. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, Session One. The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 419 (1987). See also P6ter Kovics,
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Other. provisions of Additional Protocol I, which are reviewed be-
low, cover in greater detail legal restrictions concerning distinction,
proportionality and minimizing collateral damage and incidental in-
j~y46jury.'
The 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
purports to protect victims of non-international armed conflicts.47 The
application of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts is
relevant to the use of cluster munitions, as many of the conflicts in
which they are used are civil wars."8 Protocol II applies to all armed con-
flicts not covered by Protocol I and "which take place in the territory of
a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible com-
mand, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to imple-
ment this Protocol., 49 The principle of discrimination finds its most
elemental expression in Additional Protocol II in Article 13(2): "[tlhe
civilian population as such, as well as-individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited."
The effectiveness and application since ratification of Additional Proto-
col II has been questioned, as civil conflicts in the territory of states
parties to the protocol have arisen and its applicability. has been chal-
lenged."
Intervention armie des forces de I'OTAN au Kosovo: fondement de l'obligation de respecter
le droit international humanitaire, 837 INT'L REV; RED CROSS 103 (2000), available at
http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf (arguing that the U.S. has unilaterally agreed to respect Ad-
ditional Protocol I and was bound by its provisions in Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo/Serbia in 1999). Other commentators have argued that "these provisions of Protocol
I for the protection of civilians have either codified or progressively developed customary
international law ... and, consequently, are binding today upon all parties to international
armed conflicts, including nonparties to the Protocol." George H. Aldrich, The Laws of War
on Land, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 53 (2000) (referring to Articles 48, 50-52, 57, 58, except for
prohibitions on reprisals).
46. For a useful breakdown of the elements of discrimination, see Michael N. Schmitt,
The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HuM. RTs. & DEV. L.J.
143, 148 (1999).
47. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
48. See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text for a list of conflicts in which clus-
ter munitions have been used.
49. Additional Protocol II, supra note 47, art. 1(1). Notably, the parties limited the defi-
nition of armed conflicts to "not apply to situations of internal disturbance and tensions, such
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature." Id. at art.
1(2).
50. See DOCUMENTS OF THE LAWS OF WAR 481-83 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff,
eds., 3rd ed. 2000); Aldrich, The Law of War on Land, supra note 45, at 59 ("[S]ince 1949
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In recent years, the distinction in international law between interna-
tional and internal conflicts has been eroded considerably. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia noted in the
Tadic case a fading of this distinction by finding that certain customary
rules apply in both internal and international conflicts.' Commentators
have noted and welcomed the trend of "blurring the different thresholds
of applicability. ' 2
This brief recounting of the history of the principle of discrimina-
tion in the laws of armed conflict highlights the tension between the
desire for military effectiveness and the demand to reduce as much as
possible the injury caused to civilians. As a prelude to considering to
applying these principles to cluster bombs, greater attention should be
paid to the elements of distinction and proportionality.
1. The Principle of Distinction
The distinction component finds its clearest expression in Addi-
tional Protocol I, Article 51(2) (prohibiting making civilians the object
of attack) and Article 52, which strictly limits attacks to "military ob-
jectives" (those objects which "make an effective contribution to
military action" or "offer[] a definite military advantage").53 Thus, the
intentional targeting of civilian populations, civilian individuals, or ci-
vilian objects is strictly forbidden.
This apparently straightforward principle finds different interpreta-
tions. For example, the International Committee for the Red Cross
Commentary on Protocol I considers that effective contribution includes
objects "'directly used by the armed forces' (e.g., weapons and equip-
ment), locations of 'special importance for military operations' (e.g.,
bridges), and objects intended for use or being used for military pur-
there have been many noninternational armed conflicts, but only very rarely has the state
where the conflict occurred acknowledged the applicability of [common] Article 3.");
Meron, Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 236, 261 (2000) ("[T]he
states involved are rarely willing to recognize such situations [of belligerency]. In practice,
therefore, Protocol II has seldom been formally applied.").
51. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugosl.,
App. Div., Oct. 2, 1995).
52. Meron, supra note 50, at 261-63 (noting that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have or-
dered that the laws of wars apply to U.S. actions, regardless of the type of conflict and that
the regulations promulgated by the U.N. Secretary General for U.N. troops restate broad
principles without distinguishing between international and non-international conflicts).
53. According to Article 52, "[a]ttack shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In-
sofar as objects are considered, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage." Additional Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 52(2).
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poses. 54 The ICRC defines the concept of "military objective" as ex-
cluding targets which offer only "potential or indeterminate
advantages."55
The United States, on the other hand, takes a more expansive view,
allowing the targeting of economic facilities "that indirectly but effec-
tively support and sustain the enemy's war-fighting capability."'56 Clear
examples of the United States position include the bombing of electrical
power plants both in Iraq during the Gulf War and in Serbia during the
1999 NATO "Allied Force."
2. The Principle of Proportionality & Limiting Collateral Damage
The rule of proportionality does not prohibit civilian deaths, but is
directed at limiting incidental but foreseeable damage to civilians and
civilian objects when a legitimate military objective is targeted. Propor-
tionality may also be seen as the requirement to limit collateral damage
or incidental injury. When such damage or death is "excessive" in rela-
tion to the anticipated "concrete and direct military advantage," Article
51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I prohibits the attack. The ICRC Com-
mentary on Protocol I indicates that this "expression ... was intended
to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and rela-
tively close, and that the advantages which are hardly perceptible and
those which only appear in the long term should be disregarded.""1 The
U.S. military, on the other hand, takes a more expansive view of
"military advantage":
What is a "concrete and distinct military advantage?"-[it] re-
fers to attack as a whole, not isolated parts of it, but there are no
other geographic or chronological boundaries to the term. The
rule clearly recognizes the inevitability of collateral civilian
casualties.... Military advantage [is] not limited to tactical
gains, but is linked to the "full context of a war strategy," e.g.
the execution of the Coalition war plan for the liberation of
54. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL AD-
DITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I) 636 (Yves
Sandoz et. al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC, COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I], available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf.
55. Id.
56. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, § 8.1.1 NWP 1-14M,
MCWP 5-2.1, COMDTPUB P5800.7, http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pageslegalVNWP%201-
14/NWPTOC.htm (1995).
57. ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I, supra note 54, at 684.
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Kuwait. Balancing [is] done on a target by target basis.... [o]r
it may be done on a campaign-wide basis."
A U.S. government attorney echoed such an approach in his post-
conflict assessment of United States actions in Operation Allied Force
in the Kosovo conflict:
[T]he need to intervene to save lives and restore regional stabil-
ity established the political objective for NATO's effort. There
was a specific purpose for the military actions, and they must be
judged at least in part on what the nations using the force were
trying to achieve....
"Military advantage" is not restricted to tactical gains. One must
take into account the full context of a war strategy.5 9
The risk of such an approach is that of an "ends justifying the
means" approach, whereas classic Just War theory makes a distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. Rather than the noble
purpose of a war justifying the means undertaken to achieve that pur-
pose, the "justness" of a war can be undermined by indiscriminate
actions taken in its prosecution. Among the criteria for waging a "just
war" are that the "means must be indispensable to achieve the end" and
that the means must be discriminating both in terms of proportionality
of harm and the immunity of innocents. 6° In its Commentary on Addi-
tional Protocol I, the International Committee of the Red Cross also
contends that the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is
maintained in the instrument's Preamble:
[T]he violation of the law of peace, which includes certain ex-
ceptions '(jus ad bellum)' to the general prohibition of the use
of force, neither prevents nor exempts any Party to a conflict
from respecting the law applicable in such a situation '(jus in
bello)'. A moral and humanitarian argument can be added to
58. Air & Space Law, in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK (Richard M. Whitaker, ed., &
Scott R. Morris, rev. edit. ed., 1st Rev. Ed. 1997), at 29-7.
59. James A. Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons
Learned or to be Learned, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 129, 131-132 (2000), available at
http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf. Mr. Burger's comments were made in his unofficial capac-
ity.
60. JOHN H. YODER, WHEN WAR IS UNJUST 18 (1984). U.S. training materials stress
that "military necessity is not an excuse for committing acts prohibited by the LOW [Law of
War]." Law of War, in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 18-3..An expansive
view of "military advantage," however, runs the risk of condoning the use of disproportion-
ate means of warfare.
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this legal aspect: just as the dissemination of humanitarian law
contributes to the promotion of humanitarian ideals and of a
spirit of. peace among nations, the faithful application of such
law can contribute to reestablishing peace, by limiting the ef-
fects of hostilities .... The [preamble] states that 'jus in bello'
cannot affect 'jus ad bellum.'6'
While the U.S. military tends to take a big picture view of "military
advantage," it tends to employ a shorter term view when considering the
possibility of civilian injury, heavily discounting future harm to civil-
ians as against the likelihood of immediate civilian deaths. The U.S.
military "adheres to a narrower interpretation emphasizing direct civil-
ian injuries or deaths," and when reviewing potential targets "much
greater emphasis is typically given to immediate and direct collateral
effects., 62 This method of calculating adverse effects on civilian popu-
lations is a matter of some dispute, with another view holding "that
planners must consider the long-term, indirect effects on a civilian
population." 63 Michael Walzer, a noted student of the laws of warfare,
has written that "[w]e are to weigh 'the mischief done,' which presuma-
bly means not only the immediate harm to individuals but also any
injury to the permanent interests of mankind, against the contribution
that mischief makes to the end of victory."64 Much recent commentary
has focused on long term environmental effects of warfare, emphasizing
the need for a more expansive view of collateral damage than simply
damage done at the time of conflict.
65
With these of general principles of discrimination in mind, we turn
to the specific 'case of cluster bombs. Schmitt usefully bifurcates the
discrimination principle between (1) limits on the "indiscriminate use of
weapons, regardless of their innate ability to discriminate," and (2)
"limits [on] the use of weapons that are by nature indiscriminate, that is,
incapable of discriminating between lawful (combatant and military
objectives) and unlawful (noncombatants and civilian objects) targets."'
Indiscriminate use prohibitions should apply to use of cluster bombs in
61. ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I, supra note 54, at 26, 28.
62. MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AIR
OPERATIONS 21, n.44 (2000), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1175/
index/html.
63. Id.
64. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 129 (2d. ed., 1980).
65. See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 59-60
(1989) ("The duty to avoid adverse impacts from our actions upon our natural and cultural
environment derives from the obligation we have as stewards of this planet to pass it on in as
good condition as we found it.... The duty emphasizes prevention and mitigation of dam-
age... rather than remedial measures").
66. Schmitt, supra note 46, at 147-48.
Fall 20001
Michigan Journal of International Law
populated areas due to certain geographic characteristics (the difficulty
of precise targeting and their wide-area nature), while prohibitions on
inherently indiscriminate weapons should apply to cluster bombs be-
cause of temporal characteristics (their dud rates).
B. Indiscriminate Use Prohibitions in Populated Areas:
Geographical Aspects of Cluster Bombs
The imprecise targeting of cluster munitions systems combined with
the large "footprints" of each individual cluster weapon scattering hun-
dreds of bomblets make their use indiscriminate in areas populated by
civilians. These characteristics of cluster munitions make their use in
populated areas suspect as possible indiscriminate attacks under inter-
national humanitarian law.67
1. Missed Targeting: The Imprecision
of Current Cluster Weapons
Precise targeting in a populated area can reduce collateral damage.
Cluster bombs, both as air-dropped munitions and when fired in ground-
based Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, have proven to be very difficult
to accurately target. In urban settings, the potential for greater collateral
damage clearly increases, limiting choices. According to one commen-
tator:
The risk of collateral damage resulting from air operations is
often magnified in urban settings, where military and civilian
assets are collocated and sometimes difficult to distinguish. Not
67. According to Article 51,
"Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which
are not directed at a specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method
or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of
a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without dis-
tinction. ...
[T]he following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate: (a) an at-
tack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in
a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects; and (b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 54(4), 54(5).
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only does the urban environment, by connecting and closely
packing both military and civilian resources, increase the
chances that military attacks will injure civilians or destroy ci-
vilian property, but it increases the likelihood that even
relatively small destructive impacts can unleash substantial re-
verberating effects on the urban population.... The close
proximity of civilian and military targets in urban environments
exists in the horizontal dimension (military and civilian struc-
tures situated side-by-side) as well as the vertical dimension
(military and civilian assets stacked one above the other, within
the same structure).65
A secret U.K. Ministry of Defence operational analysis of the
Kosovo crisis indicated poor targeting performance by British bombing
runs. The Hunting RBL755 cluster bombs, the British equivalent of the
U.S. CBU-87, hit their targets only 40% of the time. At least 31%
missed their targets, and 29% could not be accounted for. These un-
guided weapons were dropped generally from high altitudes. Ministry of
Defence sources claimed that poor weather could account for many of
the problems.69
The U.S.-based Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) also are
notoriously prone to poor targeting. As noted in the newest draft of the
U.S. Army Manual 6-60, "[r]ockets are inherently less precise than can-
non projectiles. They have a much larger CEP [circular error probable]
[and] are therefore much less predictable., 70 The manual goes on to state
that:
The MFOM [MLRS Family of Munitions] rockets are
extremely sensitive to the low level winds due to the relatively
low velocity of the rocket as it leaves the launch tube. The
68. WAXMAN, supra note 62, at x. Waxman defines "urban operations" as "any opera-
tions ... on terrain that is dominated by man-made structures, whether it is a small town or
large city." Id. at 2.
69. Tim Ripley & Stewart Penney, Kosovo Bombing Misses the Target, Say MoD Re-
port, FLIGHT INT'L, Aug. 15, 2000, at 4, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, News &
Information, Flight International File.
70. U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-60: TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) OPERA-
TIONS 4-12 (Draft, Aug. 11,1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter MLRS FIELD MANUAL
1999]. "Circular error probable" is "the radius of a circle within which half a missile's pro-
jectiles are expected to fall." Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD
Dictionary of Military & Associated Terms, at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict (last
modified March 18, 1998).
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resulting effect produces a path heading error in the first few
seconds of flight.7
If precise targeting is the problem, are there "technological fixes" to
resolve it? If precision guided munitions (PGMs) are available, and their
use is expected to reduce damage to civilians without reducing the ex-
pected damage to the target (or increasing the danger to the aircrew),
they should be used.72 A spirited discussion has emerged over whether
the United States should be required in urban areas or areas of mixed
civilian and military assets to use precision guided munitions. Some
have argued that the availability and increasing use of PGMs by the
United States has created an emerging norm of customary international
law. The U.S. military has strenuously objected to such a legal inter-
pretation, creating the situation of the major creator of a potential legal
norm also being its most "persistent objector."73 A related humanitarian
law consideration is the prohibition on the use of weapons that cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Training materials for U.S.
military attorneys state that an armed force "can't use otherwise lawful
arms in a manner that causes unnecessary suffering. 7 4 The example
given is that one cannot drop a 2000 pound bomb instead of precision
guided munitions against a military objective when civilians are
nearby.75
At the extreme end of the precision guided munitions spectrum is
Operation Deliberate Force, the U.N. action in Bosnia in 1995. The
Rules of Engagement for U.S. forces engaged in the action stated that
"target planning and weapons delivery will include considerations to
minimize collateral damage." Reportedly, 98% of all U.S. air-dropped
munitions were precision guided.76 NATO military leaders explicitly
decided against use of cluster munitions, out of concern for civilians.
NATO did not attack Serb gun and artillery positions with cluster
bombs, as the "long term hazard for civilians" created by an estimated
10% unexploded cluster ordnance rate was "unacceptable."77.
71. MLRS FIELD MANUAL 1999, supra note 70, app. B, at B-I.
72. Schmitt, supra note 46, at 152.
73. WAXMAN, supra note 62, at 13-14.
74. Lt. Col. Richard A. Barfield, U.S.M.C., The Law of War: Means and Methods of
Warfare, in LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK, at 7-7 (Mark E. Newcomb ed., 1997).
75. Id.
76. Schmitt, supra note 46, at 35-36.
77. Christopher Bellamy & Emma Daly, NATO Aircraft Resume Raids on Serbian Posi-
tions in Bosnia, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at 11; see also Christopher Bellamy, NATO Hails
Success of Massive Air, Attacks, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 1, 1995, at 11. Serbian forces
clearly had no such scruples about the use of cluster munitions. See, e.g., Serb Planes Drop
Cluster Bombs-Bosnian Radio, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Sarajevo), Sept. 27, 1995 (Orkan
rocket with cluster warhead targeted on city of Travnik, Bosnia kills three, injures 35, and
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The precision guided munitions "solution" to cluster bomb targeting
takes two forms. The first method is simply to stop using cluster muni-
tions altogether for the intended target and replace them with a more
accurate unitary weapon. The U.S. Army and the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees of the U.S. House of Representatives have
proposed removing cluster munitions warheads from an Army missile
system (the Army Tactical Missile System-ATACMS) and replacing
them with unitary warheads. According to a House Armed Services
Committee report, "[t]his warhead upgrade is intended to limit collateral
damage when used against targets in urban environments and is a direct
outgrowth of the Army's inability to conduct deep strike missions
against such targets with its existing ATACMS missile inventory during
Operation Allied Force. '8
That the U.S. Army decided against launching missiles with cluster
bomblet warheads into urban areas during Operation Allied Force in
Kosovo out of concern over collateral damage should also call into
question the U.S. Air Force's decision to do just the opposite, i.e., use
cluster munitions extensively. The U.S. Army's executive officer for
tactical missiles, General John Holly, stated that missiles' increased ac-
curacy supports such a change for the ATACMS missile.
Given the increased accuracy that we have demonstrated with
the ATACMS missile, we are now able to achieve the necessary
lethal effects on the target sets with the unitary warhead....
That has only previously been achievable with submunitions,
basically because we didn't have that very precise accuracy.
Now with the accuracy you can-hit the target, and when you hit
the target you no longer have as large of a beaten area around
that particular target.... As we go into coalition warfare, where
there is increased concern, as there should be, over collateral
damage, a point hit gives you tremendous capability.79
Another example of replacing cluster bombs with unitary warheads
is the British plan to replace the air-dropped RBL755 cluster munitions
with either Maverick or Brimstone missiles, each being fitted with
leaves 100 unexploded bomblets), available at LEXIS, All News, Agence France Presse
File; Tracy Wilkins, Refugee Camp in Bosnia Attacked, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at Al
(Serbian Orkan rocket with cluster warhead kills six women andchildren and wounds 30).
78. Neil Baumgardner, House Committees Want Funding for Unitary Warhead
ATACMS, DEF. DAILY, May 30, 2000, at 1. The specific plan, which was initiated but not
completed during Allied Force due to the end of the conflict, was to replace the standard
payload of 300 bomblets with a unitary 500 lb warhead on 51 ATACMS. Id.
79. Id.
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unitary warheads." According to its manufacturer, "[the] Maverick
missile offers minimum collateral damage when used in close air
support missions against urban targets."8'
The second method of dealing with cluster bomb targeting issues
attempts to simply improve the targeting of cluster munitions them-
selves. Problems with targeting bombs during Operation Desert Storm
in 1991 led the U.S. Air Force to develop several systems to attempt to
address the problem. The Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser
(WCMD), essentially a tail unit attached to existing cluster bomb muni-
tions dispensers, reportedly addresses the problem of wind drift,
allowing high altitude bombing. Air Force requirements call for the
WCMD to achieve a circular error probable of one hundred feet or
less.8 3 Tests performed in June 1999 reportedly achieved a five meter
circular error probable.4 The system has not yet been used in combat. 5
One of the public rationales given by the U.S. military for use of
cluster munitions is their effectiveness against armor, i.e., tanks, ar-
mored combat vehicles, and artillery.86 Department of Defense planning
documents, however, indicate that advanced cluster munitions are not
primarily intended for targeting armored vehicles. According to a May
2000 General Accounting Office report, "two of the Air Force's newer
and more advanced anti-armor weapons (the Joint Stand Off Weapon
BLU-108 variant and the Sensor Fuzed Weapon) are expected to be
used against unarmored targets over 60 percent of the time. 87 Indeed,
80. Ripley & Penney, supra note 69, at 8; PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING,
supra note 8, at I 11; See also Ian Kemp, Kosovo Validated U.K. Force-Projection Strategy,
JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., June 14, 2000, at 64, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's
Defence Publications File.
81. Upgrade your Mavericks, says Raytheon, JANE'S MISSILES & ROCKETS, Apr. 1,
2000, LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications File.
82. David Learmont, Smart Bombs in Demand, FLIGHT INT'L, June 9, 1999, at 125,
available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Flight International File.
83. See Jake Swinson, Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser Begins Production, AFMC
NEWS SERVICE, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/08-14-98.htm (Aug. 14, 1998);
see also David Fulghum, Isolated, Serb Army Faces Aerial Barrage, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., April 19, 1999, at 26; Stealth Could Play Key Role in Kosovo, Despite Bad
Weather, ARMED FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, Mar. 23, 1999; Gen. John M. Loh, U.S.A.F.,
Final Operational Requirements Document CAF 401-91-I/I-B for Wind Corrected Muni-
tions DispenserACAT Leve 11, at 8 (Sept. 23, 1994) (on file with author).
84. David Isby, WCMD to Begin Low-Rate Production, JANE'S MISSILES & ROCKETS,
Sept. 1, 1999, LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications.
85. See Learmont, supra note 82, at 126. For a discussion of the mix of precision guided
and unguided cluster bombs in Operation Allied Force, see infra Part IV.B. I.
86. See, e.g. Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 13, at 90 ("CEM [Combined
Effects Munition] is an effective weapon against such targets as air defense radars, armor,
artillery, and personnel").
87. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on De-
fense, Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Defense Acquisitions: Antiarmor
[Vol. 22:85
Footprints of Death
the U.S. Air Force has no intention of using the Combined Effects Mu-
nition CBU-87, the cluster munition of choice during the Operation
Allied Force in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, against armored targets. It
projects using the CBU-87 against non-armored targets 99% of the
time.
2. "Footprint" Size: Godzilla Can't Be Too Careful
Even assuming targeting issues can be overcome after all by new
technology, an insurmountable problem arises with cluster munitions in
civilian areas-the large footprints. Regardless of how carefully tar-
geted cluster munitions are in a populated area, their "footprints" are so
large as to make collateral damage highly likely. Unguided cluster
bombs which are difficult to target might be compared to a raging
Godzilla, indiscriminately stomping vast footprints of destruction, each
a square kilometer in size, through downtown Tokyo. 9 With advanced
targeting technology, a kinder, gentler Godzilla can take very careful,
gigantic footsteps, but will still cut a wide swath in an urban or popu-
lated environment.
The footprint of a cluster bomb is the area covered by the
bomblets or submunitions when they impact the ground. The
size of the footprint is determined by a variety of factors, in-
cluding design, altitude from which the dispenser is dropped,
altitude at which the dispenser opens, the dispenser spin rate,
wind, and slope of the ground on which the bomblets fall. Given
the many variables which determine footprint size, it is not sur-
prising that reported cluster bomb footprint sizes also vary....
While the majority of cluster munitions in a strike generally fall
within a concentrated area, there may well be "stray" munitions
which fall a distance from the main impact area. These "stray"
Munitions Master Plan Does Not Identify Potential Excesses or Support Planned Procure-
ments, GAO/NSIAD-00-67, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su-docs/aces/acesl60.shtml, at 9
(May 2000) [hereinafter U.S. GAO, Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan]. The report sharply
criticizes the Department of Defense for failing to justify its demands for high numbers of
anti-armor weaponry (much of it cluster munitions) in a post-Soviet world. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 18. The Navy and Marine Corps do plan to use the Rockeye against armored
targets 75% of the time, but the Rockeye is a Vietnam-era weapon not in future develop-
ment. Id. at 18, 20-21.
89. To push the analogy a bit further in anticipation of Part III.C infra, unexploded
cluster bomblets left in those footprints are like Godzilla movies; they keep rearing their
ugly heads for years to come. In "Godzilla 2000," we discover the "23rd screen appearance
of the indestructible fire-breathing monster that emerges from the sea to wreak awesome
destruction.... By the end of the film, most of Tokyo lies smoking at his feet." Stephen
Holden, He's Back! And There Goes Tokyo Once Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2000, § 5, at
12.
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munitions may or may not always be included in the estimated
footprint size.90
The area within which injury can be caused by flying fragments is
actually much larger than the actual footprint, as each bomblet showers
shards and pellets over an area with a radius of up to 150 meters.9'
As an example, the U.S. CBU-87, a cluster munition packed with
202 combined effects bomblets, has an average footprint of 200 meters
by 400 meters (according to U.S. military sources). Add an injury radius
of up to 150 meters, and there will be a typical affected area of 350 me-
ters by 550 meters.92 Another example is the Russian made RBK-500
cluster bomb dispenser. When filled with 565 ShOAB bomblets, the
resulting footprint is about 300 meters by 400 meters.93
Ellipses that size cover an area the size of several football fields.
And cluster bombs are rarely used singly; "salvo fire" overlaps several
footprints (as if Godzilla were intent on stamping out a particular area)
while "ripple" fire places footprints end to end (Godzilla strolls through
the park).94 As an example, in 1999 clearance experts in the village of
Musa, Kosovo discovered at least five cluster bomb footprints where
NATO had targeted Serb anti-aircraft positions.95
Ground-based cluster munitions footprints cover staggering
amounts of area. The Russian "Smerch" ("Tornado") Multiple Launch
Rocket System carries twelve rockets, with each carrying a standard
warhead of seventy-two submunitions. A salvo of twelve rockets covers
96672,000 square meters. A single salvo of the U.S. MLRS M270
launcher, with its twelve M26 rockets, can shower 7,728 submunitions
over a footprint of up to 600 yards by 650 yards in one minute.97
90. Wiebe & Peachey, supra note 8, at 12 (citations omitted).
91. Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id. Maj. Gen. Charles Wald estimated the CBU-87 cluster bomb footprint at 200
meters by 400 meters. Id. (citations omitted). Other elements of NATO have estimated even
larger footprints for cluster bomb strikes in Kosovo: "NATO believes there should be no
problem locating strike sites, which (including a 200m x 200m safety margin) are assumed to
be one square kilometer in size for each cluster bomb unit." Parliamentary/NATO Cluster
Meeting, supra note 8, at T 5.
93. Wiebe & Peachey, Clusters of Death, supra note 8, at 45; NORMAN FRIEDMAN, THE
NAVAL INSTITUTE GUIDE TO WORLD NAVAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS 108 (1994 update).
94. See Dantes, supra note 10, at 78-79.
95. MINES ADVISORY GROUP, Kosovo 13 (1999) (on file with author). A villager named
Gani was killed in October 1999 trying to move a BLU-97 cluster bomblet away from an
area frequented by children. Id.
96. Wiebe & Peachey, Clusters of Death, supra note 8, at 51-52 (citing Victor
Korablin, Russian Smerch, DEF. & SEC., Mar. 8, 2000).
97. Id. at 27-28, 31-32 (citations omitted).
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The MLRS M26 rocket has a large 'footprint' or dispersion of
submunitions in the target area... and therefore requires de-
tailed planning in close operations .... Specifically, they must
be careful not to assign missions or targets that are closer than
2000m to friendly troops.9"
Indeed, cluster munitions footprints are so large because targeting
historically has been so bad. Cluster weapons "are by nature indiscrimi-
naie, because bomblets or other submunitions cannot be aimed at
individual targets .... where the use of a cluster weapons is to compen-
sate for imprecision of delivery by attacking a point target with an area
weapon, most of the bomblets will explode away from the intended tar-
get."99 Militaries have also deployed cluster munitions in attacks against
areas where targets are suspected, such as wooded areas where tanks or
troops might be hiding,t ° or in "high level bombing against vast,
vaguely defined 'area targets.'
3. Massive Numbers of Multi-Purpose Munitions:
More Bang for the Buck
Central to the argument of retaining cluster bombs is their military
utility: they can do so many different things. Current generation submu-
nitions can be deployed against multiple types of targets, including
troop concentrations, defensive positions, positions behind the front
lines, tanks formations, convoys, and stockpiled supplies.' 2 They are
also cheap and plentiful. According to one analyst, "they offer un-
matched cost-effectiveness in their ability to dispense a payload over a
broad area and attack multiple -targets."''0 3 For example, Dual Purpose
98. U.S. ARMY, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, USE OF THE MULTIPLE LAUNCH
ROCKET SYSTEM (MLRS) IN MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN (MOUT) (Maj.
James E. Hutton, ed.), at http://call.army.mil/call/trngqtr/tq4-99/mlrs.htm (1999) (on file
with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter USE OF THE MLRS].
99. Eric Prokosch, Cluster Weapons, Papers in the Theory and Practice of Human
Rights #15 (Univ. of Essex, 1995) at 10. Prokosch distinguishes two types of submunitions
from this generalization: smart submunitions which individually seek out targets and
"weapons which can be aimed precisely and whose area coverage corresponds to the area of
the precise military target being attacked." Id. As an example of the latter category, he refers
to anti-runway cluster bombs, which, if used at low altitudes against airfields away from
civilian settlements. Id. at 10 n.8. Because these systems employ a mix of large cratering
bomblets with smaller time-delay anti-personnel bomblets, the time delay bomblets might
run afoul of the Mines Ban Treaty. Id. at 11.
100. See, e.g., Special NATO Briefing From Brussels: NATO Operation Allied Force
Directed Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Military And Security Targets, FED. NEWS
SERVICE, May 14, 1999.
101. Prokosch, supra note 99, at 10
102. King, supra note 11, at 37.
103. Id.
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Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs) cost as little as three dol-
lars apiece. The United States has approximately 600 million such
submunitions in its stockpile.' °'
When such weapons have such broad application and are available
to field commanders in such large numbers, the danger is that "military
advantage" considerations overwhelm humanitarian concerns. Virtually
any legitimate target can be attacked with submunitions, increasing the
tendency to indiscriminate use.105
4. Targeting + Footprint + Populated Area +
Multi-Purpose = Indiscriminate Use
Article 51 (4)(b) of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks which em-
ploy a means or method of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective. Article 51 (5)(a) considers an attack indiscriminate if it
is "an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct mili-
tary objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects." Article
57(2)(a)(ii) charges attackers with taking "all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event, minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects."
The combination of questionable targeting ability, large footprints,
and multipurpose use for submunitions makes compliance with interna-
tional humanitarian law difficult, if not impossible, when using cluster
munitions in populated areas. A U.S. Army Major acknowledges as
much in writing that "[c]ommanders must still consider the precision
error and large submunitions dispersion patterns when applying this
104. Id. at 21, 41. This estimate was arrived at by extrapolating from the total cost ($12
billion) divided by the per unit cost ($20) of retrofitting 1994 DPICM stockpiles with self-
destruct mechanisms. Id. Published figures of the total number of submunitions is difficult to
come by. A 1994 report indicated that the U.S. alone had produced 750,000,000 submuni-
tions from the mid-70s up to that point, and that Allied forces in the Gulf War had expended
at least 24,000,000 submunitions. Steven Askin and Stephen Goose, The Market for Anti-
Personnel Landmines-A Global Survey, JANE'S INTELL. REV., Sept. 1, 1994, at 425, avail-
able at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications File. The U.S. had replenished
those massive stockpiles by 1998. A 1999 U.S. General Accounting Office study indicated
that in the 1998 weapons inventory, the Rockeye was 107 percent and the Combined Effects
Munitions was 164 percent of the 1990 inventory. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report
to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, House of Repre-
sentatives, Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Anti-Armor Weapon
Acquisitions, July 1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-105, at 19, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
sudocs/aces/acesl60.shtml [hereinafter U.S. GAO, Reduced Threat]. Put simply, there are
hundreds of millions of submunitions in the military stockpiles around the world.
105. King, supra note 11, at 37.
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method of attack due to the high probability of extensive collateral
damage."' 6 The commentary in the German military manual places
cluster bombs alongside incendiary weapons and concludes, based on
Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I, that their use in "densely popu-
lated regions" is prohibited.
07
C. Landmines Super: Unexploded Cluster Bombs as Temporally
Indiscriminate & Inhumane Weapons
There is a predicted failure rate of 2-6 per cent. This is not sig-
nificantly worse than other bombs, although the difference is
there are lots of bomblets. The actual failure rate in Kosovo was
'clearly higher than 2-6 per cent'. Some say 20 per cent. NATO
believe a rate of 8-12 per cent is supported by information on
the ground.' °8
Submunitions consist of three types: impact fused, time delay
fused, and anti-disturbance fused. The anti-disturbance fused
submunitions clearly represent anti-personnel "landmine" de-
vices. Impact and time delay fused submunitions on the ground
after 23+ years may be considered duds but are very unstable.
Because there is no way to determine the type of fuse of the re-
maining CBUs, they must all be treated as anti-disturbance
devices. U.S. doctrine considers all areas littered with submu-
nitions (regardless of fuse type) as minefields."°9
Unexploded cluster bombs are inherently indiscriminate as de facto
landmines. The basic principle of humanitarian law is a simple one
codified in Article 51(4)(b): indiscriminate attacks include those "which
employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a spe-
cific military target." The landmines ban movement also appealed to the
humanitarian law principles of superfluous injury and unnecessary suf-
fering, and the dictates of public conscience, in its bid to outlaw anti-
personnel landmines. The 1997 Mines Ban Treaty (MBT) acknowl-
edged as much in its Preamble:
106. MLRS, supra note 98, at 1.
107. ICRC, 2000 CCW REPORT, supra note 17, at 12; Stefan Oeter, Methods and
Means of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 455
(Dieter Fleck, ed., 1995)
108. PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at 2.
109. Memorandum from U.S. Maj. Kevin M. McDonnell to U.S. Col. Boykin, Trip Re-
port (Laos Demining Assessment) 07 August 1995-02 September 1995, at 3 (Sept. 11, 1995)
(bold deleted, italics added) (on file with author).
Fall 20001
Michigan Journal of International Law
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitar-
ian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to
choose the method or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the
principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of
weapons, projectiles, and materials and methods of warfare of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and
on the principle that a distinction must be made between civil-
ians and combatants." 0
The same characteristics which make AP landmines indiscriminate
apply to unexploded cluster bomblets. They are small. They are often
detonated by the proximity, presence or contact of persons. They do not
"decay." Most do not have self-destruct or self-deactivate mechanisms.
In addition, there are several characteristics unique to cluster bomblets
that make them even more likely to cause harm to civilians. Their
charges are generally greater than those of landmines, as they are de-
signed to kill rather than maim."' Their elegant shapes, whether the
spherical "bombies" of the Vietnam conflict or the soda can shapes used
by both sides of the Kosovo-Yugoslav war, as well as their often bright
colors, make them irresistible to children and adults alike."2 Emerging
evidence suggests that children are more likely to be killed by cluster
bomblets than mines, in areas where both have been used."3
The proportionality arguments related to the long-term injury and
death to civilians, discussed above, apply to these characteristics of
110. Mines Ban Treaty, supra note 3, pmbl.
11. The explosive charges of cluster bomblets are generally greater than those of
landmines. Donna Kelley & Richard Blystone, One Year Later: Remnants of War in Kosovo
(CNN television broadcast, Apr. 3, 2000); E-mail from Richard Lloyd, U.K. Working Group
on Landmines to Virgil Wiebe, Center for Applied Legal Studies, Georgetown University
Law Center (June 1, 2000) (on file with author) (indicating that the BLU-97 cluster bomblet
has three times the explosive charge of a PMA2 landmine).
112. An account by a U.S. medic following the Gulf War underscores the point:
19 March 1991. The first civilian cluster bomb victim died today. It was a child.
These insidious bombs were sprinkled all over the desert. Despite numerous
warnings to the contrary, people could not leave them alone. They seemed to be
drawn to them, almost mystically.
Brian Ginn, 807th MASH, Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, 'Restore to
Serve', at http://www.iglou.com/law/mash.htm (1995).
113. The International Committee of the Red Cross found that "[iun Kosovo, children
under the age of 14 are 3.4 times more likely to be injured or killed by cluster bomb submu-
nitions than by AP [anti-personnel] mines. Incidents involving submunitions are also much
more likely than landmines to result in death or injury to several people." INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INFORMATION PAPER: EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR: OUT-
LINE OF A PROPOSAL FOR AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE U.N. CONVENTION ON CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW) (July 28, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter ICRC,
REMNANTS OF WAR].
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cluster bombs."4 Any immediate military advantage in the use of cluster
bombs must be weighed against the long-term adverse effects of unex-
ploded submunitions."5
A growing chorus of voices acknowledge that cluster bombs func-
tion as de facto landmines. The International Committee of the Red
Cross stated in July 2000 that "[a]s a result of their use and design,
submunitions have predictably high failure rates which have resulted in
significant numbers of avoidable civilian casualties."' 16 Killing Secrets,
a United Kingdom campaign for an accountable arms trade, issued a
report in May 1999 vigorously arguing against the use of cluster bombs
in Kosovo. Rae McGrath, that report's author and former director of
Mines Advisory Group, argued that an unexploded BLU 97/B bomblet
"effectively becomes a very powerful anti-personnel mine" and that
NATO use of cluster bombs would end up harming the people they
sought to help."
7
Even governments have begun to acknowledge the growing
problem of cluster munition UXO. The U.S. government, while
explicitly stating that cluster bomb UXOs are not landmines, has
admitted that use of cluster bombs even a low dud rate can result in
hazardous conditions." 8 The Dutch government recently stated that
"[e]ven a low percentage of submunitions from a cluster bomb may
provide a considerable amount of submunitions, which continue to pose
a threat. Estimates on the percentage of submunitions from a cluster
bomb which do not explode vary from no more than four percent (by the
114. See supra Part III.A.2.
115. Carmel Capati, Note and Comment, The Tragedy of Cluster Bombs in Laos: An
Argument for Inclusion in the Proposed International Ban on Landmines, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J.
227,240-45 (1997).
116. ICRC, REMNANTS OF WAR, supra note 113.
117. McGrath, supra note 38, at 3.
118. The Department of Defense explained that:
[B]ecause the bomblets are dispensed over a relatively large area and a small per-
centage of them typically fail to detonate, there is an unexploded ordnance hazard
associated with this weapon. These submunitions are not mines, are acceptable
under the laws of armed conflict, and are not timed to go off as anti-personnel de-
vices. However, if the submunitions are disturbed or disassembled, they may
explode, thus, the need for early and aggressive unexploded-ordnance clearing ef-
forts. Combined effects munitions remain an appropriate and militarily effective
weapon when properly targeted and employed. However, the risk of collateral
damage, as with any weapon, must be considered when employing these weapons.
Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 13, at 90. In Kosovo, however, the United
States did not practice what it preached. According to U.N. sources, NATO did not provide
detailed information on cluster bomb airstrikes "until nearly a year after the conflict ended."
Carlotta Gall, U.N. Aide in Kosovo Faults NATO on Unexploded Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2000, at A3.
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manufacturer) to ten to twelve percent (established by the U.N. mine
coordination centre UNMACC in Kosovo) and even higher." 9
This acknowledgment comes on the heels of the Ottawa Mines Ban
Treaty. Many in the international campaign to ban landmines urged an
"effects-based" definition of landmines, and such a definition arguably
would have encompassed many cluster bomblets. In June 1997, techni-
cal experts drafted the so-called Bad Honnef guidelines, calling for AP
landmines to be defined as "any device or piece of ordnance which, al-
though its primary purpose or design may be other than [to explode by
the contact, presence, or proximity of a person], can be deployed in a
manner to achieve this effect without modification or through a specific
design feature." 2
In the final wording of the Ottawa Mines Ban treaty, the effects-
based definition gave way to a design-based definition. 2' The Canadian
delegates to the MBT negotiations reportedly urged an effects-based
reading of the definition at MBT negotiation and the Italian govern-
ment's MBT implementing statute takes an effects-based approach to
AP mines. 22 At least one national legislature has reached the conclusion
that cluster bombs should be covered by national legislation banning
mines. The Spanish Congress agreed in February 1997 to include cluster
bombs and "arms with similar effects" in a future law banning land-
mines.' 23  In late 1997, after heavy lobbying efforts by arms
manufacturers of parliamentarians, 24 the government was reconsidering
this position. 5
119. Dutch Cluster Bomb Memorandum, supra note 37.
120. Mary Foster, Kosovo and Landmines, PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR, at 2, http://
www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/mons99c.html (Sept. 1999).
121. The MBT defines an anti-personnel landmine as "a mine designed to be exploded
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill
one or more persons." Mines Ban Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2(1) (emphasis added). See
infra Part V.A.2 for additional discussion on the making of the MBT. Dud rates are built into
contracts with weapons manufacturers. See, e.g., Laurenzo, supra note 14. It might therefore
be argued that, as duds are expected in orders of cluster munitions received from manufac-
turers, dud rates are included in the "design" of the weapons. It is acknowledged that just
because duds are expected does not mean they are desired or demanded. While a military
might return a shipment with a high dud rate, the same would not happen with a shipment
with a dud rate with a duds below the contracted rate. I am grateful to Wendy Perdue for
making this latter subtle, but important distinction. While the argument that cluster bombs
are legally landmines has not yet carried the day, it bears further consideration and research.
122. Foster, supra note 120.
123. Vicenc Fisas, Minas: Los Siguientes Pasos, EL PAls, Dec. 3, 1997, at 4, available
at LEXIS, All News, El Pais File.
124. Expal Intenta que el Congreso no Prohiba las Bombas de Racimo, EL PAlS, Sept.
21, 1997, at 15, available at LEXIS, All News, El Pais File.
125. Miguel Gonzalez, Espana Destruira en Tres Anos Sus 850,000 Unidades, EL PAlS,
Dec. 3, 1997, at 3, available at LEXIS, All News, El Pais File.
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Militaries treat unexploded cluster munitions as de facto landmines.
In its manual for use of rocket fired cluster munitions, the U.S. Army
states that "[s]ome risk will be accepted when firing MLRS into areas
friendly units could occupy or pass through during future operations."'26
A newer draft of the Army manual offers a slightly stronger wording:
"[p]lanners must consider the risk when firing MLRS into areas friendly
units could occupy or pass through during future operations.' 27 And
well they should, as artillery based and MLRS submunitions are known
to have high dud rates:
[D]espite many years of effort in the U.S. devoted to the devel-
opment of a reliable self-destruct fuze for bomblet rounds, none
has so far been applied to its 155mm ICM [Improved Conven-
tional Munition] stockpile. The latter currently consists of
M483A1 and M864 projectiles, respectively filled with 88 and
72 M42/M46 grenades, which have been known to exhibit dud
rates as high as 15%. The situation is no better with the Multi-
ple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and ATACMS missile
stockpiles.'28
According to an official U.S. document dated July 15, 1997 and
prepared for use at the Ottawa Convention negotiations in Oslo, "[w]hen
[a BLU97/B cluster bomblet] fails to operate as designed and remains
unexploded [it] can be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity
or contact of a person. And, when detonated or exploded, [it] produces
an effect similar to a traditional anti-personnel landmine.' 29
Official U.S. military response to criticism of cluster bomb use is
that duds are not mines, they are simply unexploded ordnance. Maj.
Gen. Chuck Wald, in a U.S. Department of Defense press briefing in
May 1999, characterized unexploded bomblets as being like any other
UXO, directly contradicting the 1997 U.S. report cited by Rae McGrath
above:
[T]here are some duds in there. Very few. But when they are,
it's like any other unexploded ordnance. This is not a mine.
There's no proximity on it where if you walk by or make the
ground rumble or anything like that it's going to go off. So
they're just like any other unexploded ordnance any place in the
world. But they are not a mine. They have no timers on them
126. MLRS FIELD MANUAL 1996, supra note 6, at 3-2.
127. MLRS FIELD MANUAL 1999, supra note 70, at 4-2.
128. Rupert Pengelley, Close Fire Munitions Shoot Ahead-Projectile Developers Pur-
sue Price, Precision, Range and Utility Goals, INT'L DEF. REV., Aug. 1, 2000.
129. McGrath, supra note 38, at 4.
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whatsoever or anything like that. I think it's just like a 500-
pound bomb, except there are several of them in a cluster.
That's the way I'd characterize it. 3°
A big difference between a 500-pound bomb and a 3-pound bomblet
may just be that the smaller version of unexploded ordnance can be
picked up by a child, that it can "hide" more easily, either in ground
cover or buried by the elements, and that there are 200 bomblets for
every large bomb. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Centre in
Kosovo, charged with coordinating the clearance of mines and unex-
ploded bombs in Kosovo, considers cluster bomblets to be a species
apart from both mines and other UXO. 3 ' Dud rates are apparently
higher for cluster bomblets than for other bombs and the number of
bomblets used is higher than large unitary bombs.'
Considerable dispute exists over what are the actual dud rates of
cluster munitions. NATO spokepersons repeatedly roll out a 5% dud
rate. ' In actual use, the dud rates have been known to have been much
higher. McGrath estimates that a more accurate dud rate would be 10-
15%, based on review of the Kosovo crisis and the Falklands-Malvinas
War.'34 There are multiple reasons for submunitions failure: manufac-
turing defects; movement and storage; loading, flights and landings;
bomb release; submunition ejection, dispersal and arming; and ground
impact. 3 5 Detainers in the field have cited "high altitude delivery, soft
terrain, angle of impact, and vegetation such as tress or bushes" as con-
tributing factors to a high dud rate.1
3 6
The "technological fix" most commonly proposed for dud rates is to
equip cluster bomblets with self-destruct or self-deactivate mechanisms.
Manufacturer attempts to reduce problems of malfunctions have pro-
duced problems of their own: (1) "the self-destruct mechanism itself
130. Kenneth Bacon, DoD News Briefing (May 14, 1999), transcript available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mayl999/ (last modified March 2, 2001). The Defense
Department, along with NATO, engaged in extensive legal review of missions and muni-
tions. Id.; see also, Dana Priest, Bombing by Committee, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1999, at Al.
131. MINE ACTION CO-ORDINATION CENTRE (MACC), U.N. INTERIM ADMINISTRATION
MISSION IN Kosovo (UNMIK): MONTHLY SUMMARIES, JUNE 1, 1999-MAR. 1, 2000 5 (2000)
("In this booklet NATO cluster bomblets and submunitions are NOT included in UXOs.
Included are other items of ordnance like artillery and mortar shells, hand grenades and
rockets.").
132. PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at 2.
133. See supra note 38.
134. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 27-29.
135. Id. at 25-27.
136. Wiebe & Peachey, Clusters of Death, supra note 8, at I I n.37 (citing Interview by
Titus Peachey, Peace Education Director, MCC, with ACT Deminers, Decani, Kosovo, Dec.
17, 1999).
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introduces one or more additional critical junctures into the chain" and
(2) the "introduction of a potential self-destruct failure adds considera-
bly to the danger of the non-functioned submunition. Any secondary
fusing system, once failed, has a tendency to be especially sensitive to
any disturbance or movement."' 37 It was reported that during the Gulf
War, a large number of self-destruct artillery fired mines failed to self-
destruct as designed, resulting in casualties.' Also during the Gulf War,
many air-dropped "Gator" scatterable mines equipped with self-destruct
mechanisms were found unexploded weeks and even months after they
were dropped.'39 The rhetorical promise of the high-tech fix, however, is
nearly impossible to counter in a culture where such a high degree of
faith is placed in science to resolve messy problems.
Equipping bomblets with self-destruct and/or self-deactivate
mechanisms may also result in more widespread use of the weapons, as
states may believe they are "safer" for civilians. 40 Decreasing dud rates,
of course, does nothing to address concerns raised about targeting and
footprints.
IV. CASE STUDIES: CROATIA, Kosovo AND CHECHNYA
Three case studies illustrate the arguments presented above. The
first, Prosecutor v. Martic, provides the first recorded case of a criminal
indictment for use of cluster munitions, and articulates principles that
apply beyond the facts of the particular case. In the second study, the
large number of cluster munitions used by NATO (both unguided
"dumb" bombs and precision guided "smart" ones) in its bombing
campaign in Kosovo-Serbia provides an example of their use in an
arguably "good war." Mistargeted cluster bombs, their wide area
137. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 27. McGrath refers to a restricted U.K. Ministry of
Defence memo warning clearance teams to treat submunitions armed with self-destruct
mechanisms as being equipped with anti-handling devices. Id.
138. Andrew C.S. Efaw, The United States Refusal to Ban Landmines: The Intersection
Between Tactics, Strategy, Policy & International Law, 159 MIL. L. REv. 87, 144, nn.370-
71 (1999) (citing critics of self-destruct mechanisms in actual use). On the other hand, Rob-
ert Sherman, of the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency and a primary architect of
the U.S. strategy calling for self-destruct, self-deactivation, claims a success rate of the tech-
nology of over 99.99% in testing. Id.
139. King, supra note II, at 18 ("Similar failure rates were observed among other
scatterable mines incorporating self-destruct mechanisms.").
140. Cf. Shawn Roberts, No Exceptions, No Reservations, No Loopholes: The Cam-
paign for the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, Transfer, and Use of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 9 COLO. J
INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'y 371, 378 (1998) (making a similar argument with respect to anti-
personnel mines).
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coverage in urban areas, and ongoing casualties from unexploded
ordnance raise questions as to how humanitarian a cluster bomb can be.
Finally, Russia has used an array of cluster munitions in the Chechen
wars, even in the context of harsh international criticism. The rocket
attack in October 1999 on Grozny unfortunately provides an ideal
example of how inappropriate cluster munitions are in urban areas.
A. Ethnic Cleansing Cluster Bombs: The Prosecutor v. Martic
before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Forner Yugoslavia
Few reported cases have considered the use of cluster bombs, but
the indictment of Milan Martic by the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides a richly detailed
case study. Careful factual investigation on the ground provides useful
information about the type of weapons used, the immediate and longer
term effects, the estimated dud rate, and the motivations behind the at-
tack. The case also implicates the international legal principles
discussed above.
In July 1995, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted Milan Martic, the self-
proclaimed leader of the Croatian Serb separatists, for a May 1995
cluster bomb attack on Zagreb, Croatia.141 On February 27, 1996, a Trial
Chamber of the ICTY heard evidence in the case.' 42 On March 7, 1996,
that Trial Chamber issued an international warrant for Martic's arrest.
143
As of late 2000, however, Mr. Martic had not been arrested.'"
141. Prosecuter v. Martic, No. IT-95-1 I-R61, Initial Indictment (Int'l Crim. Trib. For-
mer Yugosl., July 25, 1995) [hereinafter Martic Indictment], available at http://www.un.org/
icty/indictment/english/25-07-95.htm. The Trial Chamber subsequently confirmed the in-
dictment pursuant to Rule 61.
142. Prosecutor v. Martic, No. IT-95-1 I-R61, Transcript of the Trial Chamber, Rule 61
Proceedings (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugosl., Feb. 25-27, 1996) [hereinafter Martic Hear-
ing], available at http://www.un.org/icty/transellI9600227IT.txt (on file with the Michigan
Journal of International Law); International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia,
Third Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, http://www.un.org/icty/rapportan/thir96tc.htm (last
modified May 12, 1998).
143. International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, Press Release: The
Tribunal Issues an International Arrest Warrant Against Milan Martic, U.N. Doc. No.
CC/PIO/042-E, Mar. 8, 1996, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/pO42-e.htm (last
modified May 31, 1999).
144. See infra note 170 for an account of the failure of U.N. forces to arrest Mr. Martic.
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1. Rocket Attacks on Zagreb Lead to an Indictment
The attack on Zagreb took place in the context of a Croatian army
offensive to reclaim Croatian territory in the Krajina region. A self-
proclaimed Serbian separatist government, headed by Martic, had occu-
pied portions of that region, and the Croatian Army had moved
aggressively to recover the territory. Martic's forces, overmatched on
the battlefield, struck back by targeting rockets packed with cluster
submunitions at the Croatian capital of Zagreb.'45 According to the
prosecutors, on May 2, 1995 at 10:35 a.m., six Orkan rockets were
launched against Zagreb. Three of those rockets struck Zagreb's city
center and the other three struck Plesic, a residential area near the Za-
greb airport. The following day, shortly after noon, another six similar
rockets were launched against Zagreb. Two rockets hit the city center,
and four hit the outskirts of town.' 46 A children's hospital, an old age
home, and the National Theater sustained damage.' 47 According to a
Croatian police officer, casualties resulting from immediate injuries in-
cluded seven civilians dead, 124 severely injured, and eighty-seven
lightly injured as a result of the attacks.'48
International observers condemned the attack. The U.S. ambassador
to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, thought the attack an "utter outrage," stating
that "cluster bombs (on the rockets) sent into the centre of a European
capital are intended for one purpose and that is to kill lots of people...
Furthermore, the timing of the attacks ... is further evidence that the
sole purpose was to kill as many people as possible.'
49
The ICTY Prosecutor brought four charges against Martic for the
attacks. Counts I and III charged that he "knowingly and willfully order
an unlawful attack against the civilian population and individual civil-
ians in Zagreb," thereby violating the laws and customs of war. Counts
II and IV, charged Martic in the alternative with failing to take reason-
able and necessary measures to prevent the commission of a war crime
he knew or had reason to know was about to be committed. 50 The
145. See, e.g., Serb Rebels Rain Missiles on Zagreb, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),
May 4, 1995, at IA.
146. Martic Indictment, supra note 141.
147. Tracy Wilkinson, Serb Attacks on Croats Threaten to Widen War, L.A. TIMES,
May 4, 1995, at Al. 21 members of the Danube Ballet were among the injured. Id. at A2.
148. Martic Hearing, supra note 142, at 26-27.
149. Joel Brand, supra note 30, at 15. Ambassador Galbraith's condemnation no doubt
was influenced by the fact that bomblets fell within a hundred meters of the U.S. embassy.
Tracy Wilkinson, Serb Strike Rattles Croatian Capital, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 3, 1995, at 34.
150. Martic Indictment, supra note 141. Charges I & III specifically cited Articles 3
and 7(1) of the Tribunal's Statute. Article 3 of the Statute addresses "[v]iolations of the laws
or customs of war." While the charges do not specify the subsection of Article 3 addressed,
the factual allegations suggest that subsections (b) and (c) and Article 7(1) address individ-
Fall 2000]
Michigan Journal of International Law
prosecutors argued that regardless of whether the court considered the
conflict to be internal or international, prohibitions against attacks
against civilians are considered to be customary international law. The
question was open because there were allegations that the Krajina Serbs
were receiving assistance from the Serbian government.
Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks or reprisals against civilians
in international conflicts under Article 51(2), which states that "[lt]he
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohib-
ited." 5' Under law governing internal conflicts, Additional Protocol II
prohibits making civilian populations or individual civilians the target
of attacks under Article 4(1). The prosecutors also cited the ICTY Tadic
case, which stated that, with respect to minimal humanitarian standards,
the distinction between international and internal conflicts has become
increasingly untenable, and that a "state-sovereignty-oriented approach
has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach."'52
The evidence and arguments presented by the prosecution when seeking
the arrest warrant focused on two interrelated issues-the targeting of
civilians and the type of munition used.5 3
2. Orkan Rockets: Lethal Footprints + Poor Targeting + High Dud
Rate + Civilian Targets = War Crime
Major Ted Itani of the Canadian army served as an expert witness
on the Orkan system.' 4 The Orkan ("Hurricane") system is a multiple
rocket launch system (MLRS). The mobile launcher can be loaded with
12 rockets.'55 The range of the rockets in 1995 was fifty kilometers.
6
The bomblets of the Orkan rocket, called "dual purpose improved con-
ual criminal responsibility for the commission of war crimes, specifically targeting those
who plan, instigate, commit, or otherwise aid and abet war crimes. Charges II & IV also
cited Article 3 and Article 7(3), which addresses a superior's responsibility for the acts of a
subordinate "if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit
[prohibited] acts or had done so and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof." Statute of the Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, as amended May 13, 1998 [hereinafter
ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.html.
151. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 45, Art. 51(2).
152. Martic Hearing, supra note 142, at 6-8.
153. Id. The prosecution also went to lengths to rebut any right of retaliation allowing
civilian targeting. See id. at 7-8. Testimony was taken regarding statements made by Martic
about ordering the bombarding of Zagreb and other cities in retaliation for attacks on the
Krajina Serb forces. Id. at 20-22.
154. For Major Itani's credentials, see id. at 38-39.
155. Id. at5.
156. Id. at41.
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ventional munitions," (DPICMs), were designed for anti-personnel and
anti-armor purposes. Each bomblet has a shaped charge which can
penetrate up to sixty millimeters of armor. Each bomblet also carries
between 400 and 450 stainless steel pellets. Each rocket warhead can
carry 265, 285, or 288 bomblets.' 57 Upon detonation, the shaped charge
can bore a hole through not only a tank, but the roof of a car. The steel
balls radiate in all directions, with each bomblet having a lethal radius
of ten meters and a casualty or injury radius of up to fifty meters. 5 8
Major Itani testified that:
[Most systems employing DPICMS are] designed for use
against soft military targets. That is to say, targets that have lit-
tle or no protection, such as troops in the open; such as
installations and supply depots where there are fuel dumps or
ammunition dumps; communication centres that have not been
hardened, that is to say communications that have not been put
underground into bunkers. It can also be used against mass for-
mations of armour, that is to say armoured personnel carriers
and tanks that are deployed in an area of, say, 1,000 metres by
1,000 metres.159
The "optimum" height for the warhead to open is 400 meters. A
single rocket can disperse bomblets over an ellipse of approximately
150 meters by 200 meters. The "Circular Error Probable" for each
Orkan rocket is 600 meters, which means it may under or overshoot, or
go to the left or right of its target, by 600 meters. Major Itani stated that
this would probably improve with developments to the system, but also
that "rt]he system is designed as an area weapon, therefore, one cannot
expect pinpoint accuracy .... It can be almost indiscriminate, in fact,
the probable area is so high .... The distinction here, I think, that is im-
portant, is that it is a rocket and therefore it has no guidance system...
that can be terminally guided on to a target."'6
If one considers the footprint to be 150 meters by 200 meters, and
adds in a lethal radius of each bomblet of 10 meters, then the total lethal
157. Id. at 41-42.
158. Id. at 44.
159. Id. at 42.
160. Id. (emphasis added). Major Itani's testimony highlights ongoing confusion about
the nature of the term "Circular Error Probable" with respect to cluster munitions. For a
unitary warhead weapons, the CEP is that radius from the target that the warhead will most
likely drop within. But for a cluster munition, CEP is often used interchangeably with the
concept of "footprints," i.e., more than half of the submunitions will fall within a given ra-
dius or area. Here, Major Itani apparently is referring to the former definition of CEP, in a
sense where the center of the "footprint" is intended to fall.
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footprint is 170 meters by 220 meters. The injury radius is 250 meters
by 300 meters.
The dud rates of the rockets fired may have exceeded forty percent.
According to the prosecutors, approximately 3000 bomblets were
dropped on Zagreb, and police clearance personnel retrieved between
1220 and 1600 of them,' 6' producing a dud rate of between 40-50%. The
prosecutors stressed not only the immediate deaths and injuries caused
by the attack, but also the deaths and injuries resulting from the ex-
ploding duds. One pyrotechnician was killed, and another lost his arm
while attempting to defuse the bomblets within days of the attack.'
62
Major Itani testified that "duds" might be caused by the warheads
exploding too close to the earth, thus not allowing enough time for each
bomblet to spin and arm itself. He also stated that if a bomblet did not
directly strike an object, it might fail to explode. He explained further:
The large numbers of unarmed, so to speak, bomblets, that
could be recovered still pose a danger, as would be the case
with those that are armed, and it is a residual danger that can
last for many, many years, because if it is soft ground these
things can get buried 25, 30 centimetres, and at some future
date, through frost action or farming activity or construction,
these could be dug up and accidentally exploded.
63
Immediately following the first attack, a policeman on the scene in
central Zagreb testified that "[in] Zrinjevac Park itself, there were
bomblets all around the place. They were hanging from trees,
bomblets. ' 6 Nearly three months after the attack, four children "found
an unactivated bomblet which remained after the bombing ... and they
played with it ...... It exploded, severely injuring all four.165
161. Id. at 23. If twelve rockets were loaded with warheads carrying 288 bomblets
each, the total number of 3,456 bomblets were dropped, resulting in a dud rate of about 35%.
See id. at 24, 37. Again, if the total number of bomblets dropped was 3,456, the dud rate
surpasses 46%. A press account at the time of the attack reported a 10-15% dud rate. Tracy
Wilkinson, Croatian Troops Reportedly Mass on New Fronts, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at
A 12 (citing Jane's Armour and Artillery).
162. Martic Hearing, supra note 142, at 23. Thirty-five-year-old Ivan Markulin was
killed when he attempted to defuse a bomblet caught in a tree at the children's hospital. The
hospital director showed the carnage to Ambassadors touring the site three hours after the
attack. "This is part of the jaw of the man who tried to defuse the thing," said Ivan Fattorini.
A reporter described the corpse as "peppered with shrapnel wounds above the waist," and
having "no recognisable face." Serb Rebels Agree to Ceasefire, THE HERALD (Glasgow),
May 4, 1995, at 8.
163. Martic Hearing, supra note 142, at 45, 37-38.
164. Id. at 26.
165. Id. at27.
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3. Shrapnel in the City: Cluster Munitions as Disproportionate
Weapons in Urban Environments
The prosecutors in Martic did not argue that the Orkan rocket was a
prohibited weapon per se, but that it was prohibited to use it in the way
it was used against the civilian population.' 66 The prosecution argued
through presentation of witnesses that no legitimate military targets ex-
isted in downtown Zagreb.'67 Most telling is the prosecution's argument
that, even if there were legitimate military targets in downtown Zagreb,
this weapon was not suited to that task:
Assuming for the sake of argument that someone could argue
that a building in downtown Zagreb, at noon, in the middle of
the day, where civilians are walking around, assuming that is a
legitimate military target, quite clearly the wrong weapons sys-
tem was used to attack that building. If one was going to destroy
a military target, such as a communications centre, or such, as
some type of facility on an army base, the type of weaponry that
would be used would not have been an Orkan rocket manned
with a clustered bomb system, a system that was clearly de-
signed, in this particular instance, your Honour, to kill civilians
in downtown Zagreb and to otherwise put a reign of terror
through that city to scare them into submission.
168
Detective Sergeant Curtis, a British police officer working for the
ICTY, testified that even were the downtown Zagreb police station a
legitimate target, the Orkan was "totally the wrong sort of warhead to
use, as the Orkan missile is an anti-personnel missile," and the
bomblets were not able to penetrate buildings.1
69
A number of points are to be taken from the Martic case: (1) cluster
bombs are wide-area munitions incapable of hitting point targets in ur-
ban areas without large numbers of civilian deaths and injuries, and
(2) unexploded cluster bomblets matter, and their residual infliction of
civilian casualties long after an action is over is a factor to be consid-
ered when bringing war crimes prosecutions.'70
166. Id. at 10.
167. Id. at 12. According to witnesses, there were no military installations in Zagreb
city center. Id. at 18, 32. A police officer testified that the Ministry of Defence was located
"several kilometers" from the attack. Id. at 33.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id. at 18.
170. What happened to Mr. Martic? Nothing much-he did not appear for the hearings
and has defied the jurisdiction of the court. Despite the issuance of an international arrest
warrant by the ICTY, Martic has not been arrested. For several months, he lived in a villa in
Banja Luka, Bosnia, not far from a British Peacekeeping post. William Kole, War Criminal
Suspects Elude Tribunal, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 31, 1999, at A2. In January 2000, the former
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Robert Hayden, Director for the Center for Russian and East Euro-
pean Studies, has written that the Martic case stands for the proposition
that "use of cluster bombs against civilian targets is a violation of the
laws of war" and that "NATO's attack on Nis in May [1999] cannot be
distinguished from the Croatian Serb's attack on Zagreb for which Mar-
tic was indicted, except that civilian casualties were greater in Nis."'7'
We will see below that there are some distinctions with the incident
in Nis, Serbia, most notably the fact that neither the U.S. pilot nor his
superiors intentionally targeted civilians. What a close consideration of
the Nis case reveals is that regardless of specific intention, the use of
cluster munitions in concentrations of civilians is not only unwise, but
borders on the illegal. A wide-area munition, used in a densely popu-
lated civilian area, is likely to cause large numbers of civilian casualties.
B. Humanitarian Cluster Bombs: Operation
Allied Force in Kosovo/Serbia
I have been an orthopedist for 15 years now, working in a crisis
region where we often have injuries, but neither I nor my col-
leagues have ever seen such horrific wounds as those caused by
cluster bombs .... They are wounds that lead to disabilities to a
great extent. The limbs are so crushed that the only remaining
option is amputation. It's awful, awful.... Most people are
victims of the time-activated cluster bombs that explode some-
time after they fall .... People think it's safe, and then they get
hurt .... There are villages here where large portions of the area
cannot be accessed because of a large number of unexploded
cluster bombs .... Even when all of this is over, it will be a big
problem because no one knows the exact number of unexploded
bombs.1
7 1
President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic awarded Martic the "Order of the
Republika Srpska." Sacked Bosnian Serb President Decorates Indicted War Crimes Sus-
pects, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Banja Luka), Jan. 8, 2000, available at LEXIS, All News,
Agence France Presse File.
171. Robert Hayden, War Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 2000, at 18.
172. Paul Watson, Unexploded Weapons Pose Deadly Threat on Ground, L.A. TIMES,
April 28, 1999, at Al and Aleksandar Mitic, NATO Cluster Bombs Take Their Toll in
Kosovo, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Apr. 28, 1999, available at LEXIS, All News, Agence
France Presse File. Rade Grbic, the doctor quoted above, referred to "time-activated cluster
bombs." Time delay fuzes for submunitions do exist. Robert Pengelley, Fuzes Adapt to New
Force Deployments, INT'L DEF. REV., Feb. I, 1997, at 37. The incidents to which he refers
are as likely the result of cluster bomblet "duds." U.S. military sources claimed during the
war that no timers were used in cluster bomblets. Ken Bacon Holds Defense Department
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In March 1999, NATO forces launched a bombing campaign which
was widely hailed as a "humanitarian intervention," but also criticized
as a violation of international law for failing to receive advance sanction
by the U.N. Security Council. '73 Considerable controversy surrounds the
question of whether massive human rights violations by Serb forces,
including the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians,
were inevitable or were, in fact, provoked by the withdrawal of Euro-
pean human rights monitors and the NATO air campaign. 74 Even
assuming the "justness" of the cause, the means used to execute the war
still remained subject to the principles of discrimination under interna-
tional humanitarian law. The use of cluster bombs in Kosovo
underscored the difficulties, if not impossibility, of using such muni-
tions in civilian areas without unacceptable collateral damage and such
use also highlights the ongoing death and destruction caused by unex-
ploded cluster bomb ordnance. Indeed, it has been the use of cluster
munitions in Kosovo that has reignited debate about how and whether
they should continue to play a role in many countries' arsenals.
1. Dumb & Dumber: The Mix of Precision Guided and Unguided
Cluster Munitions in Operation Allied Force
NATO forces used both guided and unguided cluster munitions on
Kosovo and Serbia during the campaign to stop ethnic cleansing from
March to June 1999. Nearly 97% of NATO's cluster bombs were un-
guided (so-called "dumb" bombs) and the remainder some form of
precision guided (so-called "smart" bombs). I base this estimation on
reports indicating the total number of cluster munitions used against
Serbia and Kosovo, the types used, and the numbers of each type used.
NATO warplanes and cruise missiles dropped 1797 cluster bombs on
Kosovo and Serbia.17 A small number of the total were precision guided
News Briefing, FDCH POL. TRANSCRIPTS, May 13, 1999, [hereinafter Ken Bacon Briefing]
available at LEXIS, All News, FDCH Political Transcripts File.
173. Louis Henkin, Kosovo & the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention", 93 AM. J.
INT'L L., 824 (1999).
174. Compare Jonathan Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo,
93 AM. J. INT'L L., 834, 834-41 (1999) (arguing that prior to the withdrawal of the human
rights observer force, there was not evidence of massive & widespread human rights viola-
tions) and W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 Am. J. INT'L L., 860, 860-62
(1999) (arguing that human rights violations in Kosovo demanded international military
action).
175. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS?:
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE, at § 5.5
n.76 (June 2000) (1100 U.S. cluster bombs and 532 U.K. cluster bombs, relying on U.K.
Ministry of Defence and U.S. Department of Defense sources) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, "COLLATERAL DAMAGE?"], available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/
kosovo/docs/natoall.pdf; see also Fleishman, supra note 37, at A I5; Gall, supra note 118,
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munitions, probably less than sixty.116 These were the Joint Stand Off
Weapon (JSOW) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM). 77
The remaining cluster munitions were the following: British RBL-
755s, 178 United States and Dutch-dropped unguided CBU-87s, and an
unspecified number of U.S. Rockeye cluster bombs.
79
The Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW) allows flight crews greater
safety by releasing cluster weapons 15 to 45 nautical miles from their
targets.80 The JSOW dispensers, which come in two cluster munitions
variants, rely on Global Positioning System and Inertial Navigation
System technologies to guide them to their targets. 8'
While the JSOW is reportedly "unaffected by bad weather and [is]
moderately accurate if the target is located properly,"'8 2 less than fifty
JSOWs armed with cluster munitions were used during the Kosovo con-
flict.'8 3 The U.S. Navy hesitated in using them more. Among the reasons
at A3 (stating that NATO dropped 1392 cluster bombs on Kosovo alone, presumably not
including Serbia). NATO has stated in meeting with British Parliamentarians that in
"Operation Allied Force (Kosovo)[,] 333 strike missions used 1392 cluster bomb (CB) dis-
pensers." See PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at $ 1. This
suggests that the remaining 238 U.S. and U.K. cluster bombs were used against Serbia. In
addition to the 1632 British and U.S. cluster munitions, the Dutch Defence Ministry in-
formed the Dutch Parliament in November 2000 that the Dutch Air Force had dropped 165
CBU-87 cluster bombs on "surface targets such as airfields, electronic installations and as-
sembly areas for military equipment and military units, armoured units, and fuel storage
sites." Dutch Cluster Bomb Memorandum, supra note 37.
176. See infra notes 187 and 183 and accompanying text.
177. Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 13, at 90.
178. U.K. Spent $650m on 'Allied Force', JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., Jan. 26, 2000 (532
British BL 755 cluster bombs used, citing a U.K. Ministry of Defence source), available at
LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications File; MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 43
(531); Ripley & Penny, supra note 69 (531).
179. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 43. According to John Flanagan of the United Na-
tions Mine Action Centre, "We've found types of NATO weapons, like the Rockeye, that we
weren't told about." Matthew Warren, Killing Fields, BRISTOL EVENING POST, Sept. 12,
1999, at 12. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, EXPLOSIVE REM-
NANTS OF WAR: CLUSTER BOMBS AND LANDMINES IN Kosovo 6 (Aug. 2000) (on file with
author) [hereinafter ICRC, 2000 CLUSTER BOMBS AND LANDMINES REPORT].
180. Vince Crawley, GAO: Anit-Armor [sic] Missile Can't Hit Moving Targets, DE-
FENSE WK., Sept. 7, 1999; News Release, Raytheon Sys. Co., Raytheon Wins Joint Standoff
Weapon Contract Valued at $734 Million (Jan. 14, 1999) (on file with author).
181. Raytheon Wins Stand-Off Weapon Deal, JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., March 1995,
available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications File; William B. Scott,
U.S. on Track With Glide Bomb, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 22, 1996, at 54-60.
182. Bill Sweetman, Coming Soon to a Theatre Near You, INTERAVIA Bus. & TECH.,
July 1, 1999, at 37.
183. See William M. Arkin, Fleet Praises JSOW, Lists Potential Improvements, DEF.
DAILY, Apr. 26, 2000 [hereinafter Arkin, Fleet Praises JSOW] (noting the 66 JSOWs had
been used in Kosovo and Iraq); William M. Arkin, Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Per-
formance Details, DEF. DAILY, Feb. 10, 2000 [hereinafter Arkin, Kosovo Report] (noting that
17 JSOWs had been used in Iraq).
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the JSOW was not used more frequently were that "many of the targets
assigned to the Navy were inappropriate to be attacked with the cluster
bomb variant," but also "[t]here were also concerns expressed about
collateral damage from the JSOW vehicle itself after it had dispensed
submunitions. Analysis shows that after dispense, the JSOW becomes
unstable and impacts the ground 200-300 yards downrange.'
The anti-armor "sister" to combined effects munition JSOW, the
JSOW AGM-154B armed with sensor fuzed (SFW) cluster bomblets,
has also received criticism from the General Accounting Office for its
alleged failure to "ensure minimizing of collateral damage from stand-
off distances." This SFW version of the weapon was not used in
Operation Allied Force.
8 5
Less than one percent of the cluster bombs used in Operation Allied
Force were cruise missiles. The Tomahawk Land Attack cruise missile,
capable of carrying either 166 cluster submunitions or a unitary war-
head, is guided to its destination by precision guidance systems.'86 Two
hundred and thirty-eight Tomahawks were used during the war, report-
edly ten (10) of which carried submunitions87 The Tomahawks
equipped with cluster submunitions were used to "strike airfields and
other areas where light vehicles were parked" and other "mobile tar-
gets."'88 United States and British officials claimed that 198 of the 238
tomahawks hit their targets, or about eighty-three percent.'88 The U.S.
admiral in charge of naval forces during the crisis claimed "zero collat-
eral" damage resulting from Tomahawk use. 9 ° This assessment of
184. Arkin, Fleet Praises JSOW, supra note 183 (report based on minutes of meeting
between war fighters and technical experts from the government and defense contractors).
185. Crawley, supra note 180.
186. Amy Truesdell, Cruise Missiles: The Discriminating Weapon of Choice?, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REv., Feb. 2, 1997, at 87, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's De-
fence Publications File; Navy Fact File, U.S. Navy, Tomahawk Cruise Missile, at
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-toma.html (last modified Jan. 28,
1999). The missile also can carry electric attack submunitions (small bomblets which dis-
perse silica thread or powder to disable electricity grids). John Robinson, TLAM
Performance in Kosovo Shows Heightened Tactical Role, DEF. DAILY, Oct. 12, 1999, at 1.
187. Bryan Bender, Tomahawk achieves new effects in Kosovo, JANE'S DEFENCE
WKLY., July 19, 2000, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publications
File. The U.S. Department of Defense After-Action report noted that 218 Tomahawks were
used. Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 13, at 92. The "majority" of the toma-
hawks used were the unitary warhead version; four were the electric attack version.
Robinson, supra note 186, at 1.
188. See id.; Bender, supra note 187.
189. Bender, supra note 187. It is not clear what the target percentage was for the
cluster bomb variant. Id.
190. Robinson, supra note 186, at 1.
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collateral damage likely does not take into account longer-term injuries
and deaths resulting from unexploded cluster bomblets.' 9'
The vast majority of the cluster munitions deployed in Operation
Allied Force were "dumb" bombs. One of the so-called smart bombs,
the Joint Stand Off Weapon, performed with less intelligence than ex-
pected, and its use was therefore limited.
2. Death on Contact: Immediate Civilian Casualties
During the Air Campaign
As stated above, NATO aircraft and missiles visited over 1797
cluster bombs on Kosovo and Serbia during the seventy-eight-day air
campaign, with nearly 97% of those weapons being unguided RBL-
755s, CBU-87s, or Rockeyes. ' Here we examine civilian casualties
resulting from cluster bomb use and the military effectiveness of the
bombing, including errant targeting and foot print patterns. Both during
and after the campaign, NATO officials claimed the use of cluster
bombs was perfectly legal under international law. In a briefing in mid-
May 1999, reporters questioned U.S. Maj. Gen. Charles Wald about
whether military lawyers had occasionally vetoed the use of CBU-87s.
His response: "Never. It's not illegal. It's totally within the law of
armed conflict, and it's legal in the international community to use that
weapon."' 93 Taken at face value, General Wald's response indicates that
Pentagon lawyers never called off a cluster bomb attack as unlawful.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented civilian deaths in the
NATO air campaign, confirming seven incidents involving civilian
deaths due to cluster bombs, and finding an additional five "likely inci-
dents involving civilian deaths." Between ninety and one hundred and
fifty civilians died as a result. '9 4 HRW stated that "[c]luster bombs
should not have been used in attacks in populated areas, let alone urban
targets, given the risks."'' 5 By April 1999, according to its chief doctor,
Pristina's hospital had treated between 300 and 400 people wounded by
cluster bombs; roughly half of those victims were civilians. The doctor
also stated that because the number did not include those killed by the
191. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part tV.B.I.
193. Ken Bacon Briefing, supra note 172.
194. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Civil-
ian Deaths]. NATO claims that there were only "three incidents allegedly involving
collateral damage caused by CBs [cluster bombs]." PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER
MEETING, supra note 8, at T I.
195. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 194.
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bombs, and covers only the area of Pristina, the casualty toll was almost
certainly higher.'96
These deaths and injuries occurred, even though the air campaign
witnessed an "unprecedented review of targeting," with legal officers
involved in targeting decisions at multiple command levels.' 97 "Great
effort" was made "to limit attacks to military targets, and to limit the
extent of collateral damage to the civilian population .... In many cases
targets were rejected because of their location in the vicinity of civilian
housing or other civilian objects . . . or if collateral damage might be
expected to be politically if not legally excessive."'98 The task of
"producing targets" involved lawyers, targeteers, and intelligence ana-
lysts charged with reworking all attack plans for any target where more
than 20 civilians might be killed.'99 In response to a Congressional in-
quiry following the war, the Pentagon responded by saying that
"[c]luster munitions are governed by the same Law of Armed Conflict
requirements that apply to the use of any other weapon in the military
inventory. ' 2 ° When considering a strike against a specific target, the
military advantage was weighed against the collateral effects. If the ex-
pected collateral damage was judged to be excessive in relation to the
military advantage, according to the U.S. Defense Department, the at-
tack did not take place.'
Pentagon lawyers had to depend on accurate assessments of collat-
eral damage from warfighters. If the failure rate of submunitions given
to those conducting legal reviews was five percent, as Pentagon spokes-
persons claimed to the press, then the assessment of collateral damage
was unlikely to be accurate. Also, because cluster munitions have such
broad application to different target types, their multipurpose nature
might make any "legitimate target" subject to attack by cluster muni-
tions.
In May of 1999, the United States temporarily halted the use of
cluster bombs "following two incidents of off-target impacts of cluster
munitions., 202 Human Rights Watch first reported this in December
1999, stating that "President Clinton issued a directive prohibiting
196. Watson, supra note 172.
197. Burger, supra note 59.
198. Id.
199. Dana Priest, Target Selection Was Long Process, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1999, at
M2.
200. Letter from Lt. Gen. C.W. Fulford, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, Director, Joint Staff, to
Representative Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) (Mar. 7, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Fulford Letter].
201. Id.
202. Id.
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further cluster bomb use in the conflict.... In doing so, the president
ha[d] set a precedent for restricting cluster bomb use. 2 3 Human Rights
Watch reiterated in February 2000 that international criticism of the
indiscriminate nature of cluster bombs led to "an unprecedented (and
unannounced) U.S. executive order in the middle of May to cease their
further use in the conflict.""° Cluster bomb use by the United States,
however, did resume in Serbia/Kosovo. According to the Pentagon:
The decision to temporarily halt the United States use of cluster
munitions during the NATO air campaign in FRY [Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia] was made by the NCA [National
Command Authorities] following two incidents of off-target
impacts of cluster munitions. The moratorium was verbally im-
posed during a regularly scheduled teleconference between the
NCA and USCINCEUR [U.S. Commander in Chief, European
Command]. The use of cluster munitions later resumed follow-
ing a review of U.S. procedures.0 5
The Dutch government, which also used CBU-87s in the conflict,
called a similar suspension of their use, in line with the U.S. decision.
Unlike the United States, however, the Dutch government did not de-
cide to resume use of the weapon during the conflict. 6
United States ground based cluster munitions systems, the Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS), were also reportedly included in the "temporary halt"
because of their similar potential effects on civilians. Commanders of a
203. Human Rights Watch, Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Delegates,
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/about/projects/arms/memo-cluster.htm (Dec. 16, 1999) [hereinafter
HRW, Cluster Bombs].
204. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 194. According to the Penta-
gon, "[t]he decision by the United States to temporarily suspend the use of certain cluster
munitions during the air campaign was unilateral. The U.S. decision did not prevent others
nations participating in the air campaign from using any specific munitions or employing
cluster munitions if such munitions were the appropriate weapon for the target selected."
Fulford Letter, supra note 200.
205. Fulford Letter, supra note 200 (emphasis added). It is not clear what that review
was or what the changes made were. According to the U.K. Ministry of Defence, "[t]he type
of cluster bomb used by the U.S. was discovered to have a fault and was temporarily with-
drawn from service, being returned to service shortly thereafter for use until the end of the
conflict. The U.K. uses a different type, which continued to function normally, and there was
thus no reason for it to be withdrawn." U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, Kosovo: LESSONS FROM
THE CRISIS 7.47 (June 2000) [hereinafter U.K. MoD, Kosovo LESSONS], available at,
http://www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/lessons/chapter7.htm. In light of the fact that only 40% of
the U.K.'s cluster bombs hit their targets, perhaps the British should have halted their use
when the Americans did. See Ripley & Penney, supra note 69.
206. Dutch Cluster Bomb Memorandum, supra note 37. The suspension of use was
lifted on October 27, 1999, well after the end of the war. Id.
[Vol. 22:85
Footprints of Death
potential ground invasion force were reportedly working to get the re-
strictions lifted when the war ended.2 7
In a much heralded attack following resumption of cluster bomb
use, two U.S. B-52 bombers attacked Serb troop concentrations on
Mount Pastrik on June 7, 2000. Some commentators claimed that it
contributed to the peace by pressuring Serb negotiators.2 °8 Indeed,
NATO commanders believed at the time that hundreds of troops had
been killed "in the single most devastating strike of the war."2°9 After the
war, however, "U.S. airmen who flew over Mount Pastrik found no sign
of a slaughter on that scale," and NATO commanders were astonished
210by the numbers Serbian troops withdrawing from Kosovo.
The overall military effectiveness of the bombing campaign has
been called into question. Both the United States and the United King-
dom claim that cluster bombs are effective against armored vehicles and
artillery positions. A report based on air and ground assessment by the
U.S. Munitions Effects Assessment Team (MEAT) found that of 744
confirmed NATO strikes (including both cluster bombs and other mu-
nitions), only fifty-eight were successful. The report found that fourteen
tanks, eighteen armored personnel carriers, and twenty artillery pieces
were destroyed.2 1 ' Another military analyst found that submunitions "did
not appear to make a significant contribution to the air campaign; most
high-priority targets were attacked using precision-guided munitions."22
NATO aircraft dropped multiple cluster bomb units on each target,
leaving multiple foot prints.23 Recall Godzilla, trying to smash a single
house in a village, stomping around the whole village to insure success.
In civilian areas, Article 51(4)(c) defines indiscriminate attacks as
207. Sean D. Naylor, Commanders Fight to Keep Missiles, MLRS in Air War, ARMY
TIMES, June 7, 1999, at 10.
208. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over Kosovo, SURVIVAL,
Oct. 1, 1999, at 18.
209. Dana Priest, Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won the War, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
1999, at Al. Recall that a single B-52 can carry forty cluster bombs, or a total of 8,080
bomblets. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
210. Priest, supra note 209. NATO initially estimated that "as many as 400-600 sol-
diers may have been killed." Subsequent reports "by military analysts and U.S. airmen state
that there was no evidence of such a large number of casualties and few signs of heavy
equipment losses." King, supra note 11, at 24.
211. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 48. The MEAT report was suppressed and replaced
with one written by Harry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which found, based
largely on pilot interviews, that more than 10 times as many targets were destroyed (140
tanks, 220 armored vehicles, and 450 artillery pieces). Id.
212. King, supra note 11, at 24.
213. In Kosovo, 1392 cluster bombs were used in 333 strikes, or an average of about 4
cluster bombs per strike. PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at 11.
Presumably, the remaining 238 cluster bombs of the total 1630 deployed were directed
against Serbia proper.
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including those "which employ a method or means of combat the effects
of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." As an
example:
[I]n a park just on the outskirts of Pristina, the administrative
capital of Kosova, allied forces dropped up to 20 cluster bombs
on a small Yugoslav army installation. The building belonging
to the installation was presumably destroyed by a larger bomb,
but the wooded hillsides on both sides of the road through the
park are roped off and marked as dangerous. The ordnance from
the 20 cluster bombs used in the strike covers a wide area.2 4
The U.S. DOD Kosovo Operation After Action Report to Congress
in February 2000 had but one paragraph dedicated to the use of cluster
bombs, and reiterated the DOD contention that their use is legal and that
they are not mines, while paying lip service to the collateral damage
effects.25 Human Rights Watch harshly criticized the report, asserting
the United States failed to acknowledge any need for changes to NATO
doctrine or practice. It termed the report's defense of cluster bombs as a
"feeble justification ... without acknowledging their unacceptable risk
to civilians. 2 6
On June 2, 2000, Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
announced to the Security Council that after an eleven month review,
the ICTY would not open a formal investigation of NATO leaders for
alleged war crimes in their execution of the actions in Kosovo. Included
among the allegations, lodged by three separate groups (one of Yugo-
slav critics, one comprising international legal scholars, and the Russian
parliament), were that cluster bombs were designed to target civilians.
The review committee concluded that the charges did not merit an in-
vestigation.2"7
214. Wiebe & Peachey, Clusters of Death, supra note 8, at 13 (citations omitted). Ser-
bian forces bear some responsibility, as parties to a conflict are charged with the
responsibility, to the maximum extent feasible, to "avoid locating military objectives within
or near densely populated areas." Additional Protocol I, supra note 45, art. 58(b).
215. Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 13, at 90.
216. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Pentagon Report Whitewashes Civilian
Deaths in Yugoslavia (Feb. 8, 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/nato208.htm.
217. Charles Trueheart, U.N. Tribunal Rejects Calls for Probe of NATO, WASH. POST,
June 3, 2000, at A9. One effort urging the ICTY prosecutor to seek indictments against
President Clinton and Defense Secretary William Cohen was led by Jerome Zeifman, former
chief counsel for the House Watergate committee. Included in the suggested counts against
the two were:
[Vol. 22:85
Footprints of Death
Following closely on the heels of Del Ponte's decision was an Am-
nesty International report which said that "NATO violated international
law in its bombing war over Yugoslavia by hitting targets where civil-
ians were sure to be hit."2 8 Kenneth Roth, the executive director of
Human Rights Watch, also criticized NATO actions, including use of
cluster bombs as "inherently indiscriminate weapons" near civilian ar-
eas.219 Amnesty International, in its report, stated that:
Cluster bombs are not banned under international law, but they
do present a high risk of violating the prohibition of indiscrimi-
nate attack. In addition, cluster weapons present a humanitarian
issue due to their high dud rate (NATO officials acknowledged
to Al that the rate is approximately five percent). This means
that unexploded sub-munitions are a continued threat to anyone
who comes into contact with them. According to some press ac-
counts, thousands of unexploded canisters are still, one year
after the conflict, left on the ground in Kosovo alone. Many of
these bomblets are embedded beneath the surface of the soil and
are not easily detected.2
On June 13, 2000, ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte publicly released the
committee report. It stated that
There is no specific treaty provision which prohibits or restricts
the use of cluster bombs, although, of course, cluster bombs
must be used in compliance with the general principles applica-
ble to the use of all weapons .... There is ... no general legal
consensus that cluster bombs are, in legal terms, equivalent to
221landmines.
The killing, injuring, terrorizing and destruction of the homes of thousands of Ser-
bian and other civilians in former Yugoslavia, including, but not limited to such
acts described by former President Carter as ... [tlhe use of antipersonnel cluster
bombs that have resulted in damage to hospitals, offices and residences of ambas-
sadors, and the senseless and brutal killing of innocent civilians and conscripted
troops; and [t]he use of specific types of cluster bombs that are designed to kill
and maim humans and are condemned almost universally by other nations, as are
land mines.
James P. Lucier, Just What is a War Criminal?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Aug. 2, 1999, at 13.
218. Amnesty International Accuses NATO of Illegal Bombing Raids, BALT. SUN, June
8, 2000, at 18A.
219. Id.
220. Amnesty International, "Collateral Damage"?, supra note 175, at 21.
221. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FINAL REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO
REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA,
PR/P.I.S./510-E, at T27 (June 13, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/
nato061300.htm.
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The ICTY prosecutor's report also went to great lengths to distin-
guish the ICTY Martic case discussed above, in which Serbian
separatist Milan Martic was alleged to have deliberately targeted Za-
greb's civilian population with cluster bombs, from NATO cluster bomb
use ("[tjhere is no indication cluster bombs were used in such a fashion
by NATO").2 While it is true the Martic case focused in part on the
international humanitarian law prohibition against deliberately targeting
civilians (the principle of distinction), it also considered the proportion-
ality principles at issue in the NATO bombing campaign. It did so by
focusing attention on both military utility arguments (i.e., whether the
use of wide-area cluster munitions was appropriate in a densely popu-
lated area even if legitimate military targets were located there) and the
longer-term dangers caused to civilians by unexploded ordnance.2
Even acknowledging the distinction between intentional terror at-
tacks on civilians on the one hand, and efforts to target "legitimate"
military objectives (which stretched well beyond explicitly military
materiel and personnel to include the economic infrastructure of Serbia
and Kosovo), the choice of weapons, the method of delivery, and the
known long term consequences should be taken into account in propor-
tionality considerations. Cluster munitions were being dropped from
altitudes over 15,000 feet in order to protect the lives of pilots at the
cost of the lives of civilians. 4 The U.S. Air Force has acknowledged the
"inaccuracy when dropped from higher altitudes" of Combined Effects
Munitions and knew of this problem well before the Kosovo conflict,
leading to its decision following the Gulf War to develop more accurate
targeting mechanisms (e.g., Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers).22 5
The United States was well aware of the likelihood of high dud rates of
both the CBU-87 and the Rockeye systems that it deployed, based on its
experience in the Gulf War.
22 6
222. Id.
223. Eric Ostberg, of the ICTY Prosecutor's Office, told the Tribunal that "[i]f one was
going to destroy a military target, such as a communications centre, or such, as some type of
facility on an army base, the type of weaponry that would be used would not have been an
Orkan rocket manned with a clustered bomb system." Martic Hearing, supra note 142, at 12.
The Tribunal also heard expert testimony that the cluster bomb rocket used was an area mu-
nition inappropriate for use in urban areas and that a high number of duds caused injury and
death after the attack, including the severe injury of four children a full three months after
the attack. Id. at 23-27, 42-44.
224. Lucier, supra note 217.
225. U.S. GAO, Reduced Threat, supra note 104, at 17; Human Rights Watch, Ticking
Time Bombs, supra note 29, at 8-9 (citing the U.S. Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey).
226. Particularly shocking was the continued use of Rockeyes, which were shown in
the Gulf War to have dud rates as high as 40%. King, supra note 11, at 17. The U.S. DOD
claimed a 5% dud rate for air-dropped submunitions during Operation Allied Force, mysteri-
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Such temporally indiscriminate (high dud rates) and geographically
indiscriminate (wide-area nature) features of these weapons are what
call into question the legality of the cluster bomb use during Operation
Allied Force. The ICTY Prosecutor failed to even consider injuries from
unexploded ordnance in Kosovo and Yugoslavia in her decision not to
indict. The Prosecutor's office narrowly read the Martic indictment to
avoid indicting NATO forces for cluster bomb use.
3. Death from Duds: Collateral Damage from
Unexploded Ordnance
Casualties: NATO figures dated 2 July [2000] show a total of
148 casualties caused by cluster bomblets since the conflict
ended-101 injuries (57 children, 31 adults, 13 KFOR soldiers)
and 47 deaths (24 children, 18 adults, 5 KFOR soldiers). The
most vulnerable civilians are children aged 7-16. CBs [cluster
bombs] will certainly kill people touching them when they ex-
plode.227
Twelve-year-old Adhurim Bajrami was playing in a field [in
September 1999] with his five young cousins when innocent
games turned to tragedy. One of the kids set off an explosion
that killed four of the boys and left Bajrami's back scarred with
shrapnel. Family members blame Serbian mines, but the U.S.
military concluded that the danger came from NATO itself. The
four boys were killed by remnants of NATO cluster bombs.228
The use of cluster munitions in Kosovo and Serbia created de facto
mine fields. In the Spring of 2000, deaths and injuries from cluster
bombs were on the rise.229 Already during the conflict, the dangers of
unexploded cluster bombs became apparent. Serbian forces used both
rocket-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions early in the conflict, with
deaths resulting from unexploded Orkan submunitions . Critics pointed
out the problem of duds. Joost Hiltermann, director of the Arms
Division of Human Rights Watch, called for a halt to cluster bomb use
ously half the 10% rate cited in 1995 for a decision not to use cluster bombs in Bosnia. See
supra note 77 and accompanying text.
227. PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at 4.
228. Kevin Whitelaw, NATO's Nasty Surprises, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 25,
1999, at 43.
229. See, e.g., Gall, supra note 118, at A15; Nicholas Wood, Kosovo Mine Expert
Criticises NATO, (BBC News broadcast, May 23, 2000).
230. Virgil Wiebe, Mennonite Central Committee Report, Cluster Bomb Use in the
YugoslavialKosovo War, at http://www.mcc.org/misc/CBinYugo.html (June 1, 2000).
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during the war, arguing that "[t]he duds that are left inside cluster
bombs effectively turn into landmines .... And like antipersonnel
landmines, they kill civilians even years after the conflict has ended.
NATO should stop using them immediately."23' Serbian fired cluster
bomblets also proved to be a hazard and, in one well-publicized
instance, a curious Albanian policeman died when he picked up an
unexploded submunition fired by a Serbian Orkan rocket.
232
As in earlier cluster bomb ridden conflicts, children have been
drawn to cluster bomblets. According to a report in October 1999, "most
of the victims have been children, who were attracted by the bright-
yellow cylinders that appeared to be toys." 2"3 According to a UNHCR
spokesperson, cluster bomblets are attractive to children because they
are bright yellow hard plastic because "[t]hey are only a foot long and
easy to pick up and tend to go off as soon as they are disturbed. The re-
sult is usually fatal. 234
Responding to a question about the attractive nature of unexploded
bomblets to children and the chance for accidents, NATO spokesperson,
Maj. Gen. Charles Wald responded:
I hope that doesn't happen, but I would certainly say that the
sooner we have the Serb/MUP forces leave Kosovo, and we can
have the Kosovar Albanians get back to a normal life, there are
probably going to be a lot more children survive because of that
than they would picking up some small object accidentally out
in the trees.235
During the same press briefing, Maj. Gen. Wald had stated that U.S.
military planners had made proportionality considerations in the use of
cluster bombs. The above statement seems to equate "Kosovar
Albanians getting back to a normal life" with a "direct and concrete
military advantage" under Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I.
Such a position provides a perfect example of the U.S. military's
231. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, NATO's Use of Cluster Bombs Must Stop
(May I1, 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/may/cluspress.html. A colleague and
I wrote in June 1999 that "[t]he rate at which cluster bombs fail to explode at the intended
time is 5 to 30 percent. Use of cluster bombs, then, is tantamount to the creation of uncharted
mine fields." Titus Peachey & Virgil Wiebe, War's Insidious Litter, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, June 9, 1-999, at 11.
232. Anton Antonowicz, The Shell That Thundered in the Hill Yards Far Away From
Me, THE MIRROR (London), April 20, 1999, at 4; Wiebe, Cluster Bomb Use in the Yugosla-
via/Kosovo War, supra note 65.
233. Whitelaw, supra note 228, at 15.
234. Francis Elliott, Kosovars Still Being Maimed by NATO Bombs, SCOTLAND ON
SUNDAY, Nov. 21, 1999, at 7.
235. Ken Bacon Briefing, supra note 172.
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position that proportionality considerations can be done on a "campaign
wide basis" and the "full context of a war strategy. 236 Such a calculus
swallows the rule, especially in light of the foreseeability of cluster
bomb deaths and injuries.
The U.K. Ministry of Defence issued its report on Operation Allied
Force in June 2000, stating that:
U.K. armed forces will always use the weapons systems judged
most effective against a given target, taking into account the
need to minimise collateral damage. The bomblets are designed
to detonate on impact but, as with any other similar munitions, a
small percentage failed to do so. The manufacturer's estimated
failure rate for the RBL 755 cluster bomb used during the
Kosovo conflict is approximately 5%. Contrary to a number of
stories in the media, cluster bombs should not be confused with
anti-personnel type weapons that are specifically designed to lie
dormant and detonate once disturbed. Cluster bombs are an ef-
fective weapon against area targets such as a group of soft-
skinned military vehicles. 7
When reading the Ministry of Defence's warning not to "confuse"
cluster bombs and landmines, it is difficult not to be reminded of the
saying "if it looks, acts, and smells like a duck, it must be a duck." To
paraphrase the report, cluster bombs should be confused with anti-
personnel type weapons that are specifically foreseen to lie dormant and
detonate once disturbed. According to Human Rights Watch, "[t]he
[U.K.] government claims that cluster bombs should not be 'confused
with' anti-personnel landmines just because they are not intended to
harm civilians. But their unexploded bomblets are just as lethal as
landmines when civilians stumble on them. 238
By July 2000, NATO had acknowledged a dud rate of 8-12% (after
consistently claiming a 5% rate for over a year), while other experts
have suggested an even higher rate.239 In its After Action report, the U.S.
Department of Defense acknowledged that there is an unexploded
ordnance hazard associated with cluster bombs, that there is a need for
early and aggressive unexploded ordnance clearance, but that cluster
bombs are not mines and are acceptable under the laws of armed
conflict' u0 The actions of NATO in terms of cluster bomb clearance,
236. See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
237. U.K. MoD, Kosovo LESSONS, supra note 205, 1 7.46.
238. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, Letters to the Editor:
Cluster Bombs Require Tighter Control, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 2000, at 16.
239. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
240. Kosovo AFTER-ACTION REPORT, supra note 13, at 90.
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however, did not live up to the rhetoric. NATO failed to inform mine
clearance teams of the estimated locations of cluster bomb strikes for
nearly a year after the conflict was over. Military mine clearance teams
restricted their work to clearing areas considered "essential" for their
mission, leaving while many cluster bomb sites remained uncleared and
unmapped. Kosovar Albanian refugees were not warned of the dangers
241
of cluster bombs before their return .
Beyond the very real dangers to life and limb caused by unexploded
ordnance, cluster bomb UXO and landmines impede the use of agricul-
tural land and "social space" (defined as an area within a 500 meter
radius of any town or settlement, and 200 meters either side of a road or
track).2 2 Unexploded cluster bomblets in Kosovo have functioned as de
facto landmines, as they have in multiple conflicts before.24 '3 They are
inherently unable to discriminate between enemy soldier and civilian.
"Humanitarian" cluster bombs continue to kill the very persons they
were intended to save.
4. Errant Footprints: The Cluster Bombing of Nis
One of the most highly publicized accidents involving CBU-87
cluster bombs during the war occurred in the Serbian city of Nis and
evidently was one of the incidents leading to a pause in the use of clus-
ter bombs discussed above.2' On May 7, 1999 a cluster bomb strike
intended for the Nis airport went astray. The city's hospital complex and
outdoor market were both hit by combined effects munitions, resulting
in early reports of up to 15 deaths and 70 injuries.25 According to Hu-
man Rights Watch, the mid-day attack "killed fourteen civilians and
injured twenty-eight. Cluster bomb submunitions fell in three widely
separated areas: near the Pathology building of the Nis Medical Center
in southeast Nis; in the town center near the Nis University Rector's
Office, including the area of the central city market place, the bus sta-
tion near the Nis Fortress, and the '12 February Health Center'; and near
a car dealership and the "Nis Express" parking lot across the river from
the fortress. 2 46 According to HRW, the nearest cluster bomb strike to
the Nis airport was 1.5 kilometers, and the farthest was 6 kilometers.
241. Gall, supra note 118, at A3.
242. ICRC, 2000 CLUSTER BOMBS & LANDMINES REPORT, supra note 179, at 22. UXO
and landmines in Kosovo affect access to agricultural land and clean water, kill cattle, and
endanger children at their schools. Id., at 22-23.
243. See supra Part III.C.
244. See supra Part IV.B.2.
245. Serbs Say 15 are Killed at Hospital and Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at A7
[hereinafter Serbs Say]
246. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 194.
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Amnesty International noted that, even granting the Nis airport as a le-
gitimate military target, "there are residential buildings very close to the
perimeter of the airfield, in the suburb of Medosevac. '247 Indeed, British
media reported the area surrounding the Nis airport was cluster bombed
on May 17 but was unable to give details on casualties or damages. 28
NATO Secretary General Solana confirmed that NATO had carried
out the attack, stating that "NATO has confirmed that the damage to the
market and clinic was caused by a NATO weapon which missed its tar-
get."249 According to Human Rights Watch, its U.S. Air Force sources
revealed that "the CBU-87 cluster bomb container failed to open over
the airfield but opened right after release from the attacking airplane,
projecting submunitions at a great distance into the city."25 Only four
days before the incident, NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea responded to
questions concerning the targeting of electrical facilities in Nis, and
stated that care had been taken to insure that facilities like hospitals in
Nis had redundant power capabilities. Ironically, the hospital itself was
then hit in the May 7 attack.25'
Police initially reported finding 20 unexploded bomblets in the area
of the strikes with "[a]bout 10 yellow canisters with parachutes attached
were visible on the street near the hospital. 2 2 Later Serb reports stated
that "there are several hundred unexploded cluster bombs in the city
center.
253
Amnesty International concluded that:
The use of cluster bombs and the fact that the attack was made
at a time of day when civilians were bound to be present, sug-
gests that NATO may have failed to ensure that necessary
precautionary measures [required by Article 57 of Protocol I]
were taken in this instance, in violation of the laws of war....
Amnesty International believes that in this instance, NATO
failed to meet its obligations to take necessary precautions by
using cluster weapons in the vicinity of civilian concentrations,
thereby violating the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks under
Article 51(4) and (5) of Protocol 1.254
247. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "COLLATERAL DAMAGE?", supra note 175, at 58.
248. Peter Almond, Clearing Weather Allows Night of Heavy Bombing, EVENING
STANDARD (London), May 18, 1999, at 5.
249. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 194.
250. Id.
251. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "COLLATERAL DAMAGE?", supra note 175, at 59.
252. Serbs Say, supra note 245, at A7.
253. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths, supra note 194.
254. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "COLLATERAL DAMAGE?", supra note 175, at 59-60.
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Defenders of particular military actions validly criticize post-
conflict "arm-chair" analysis as divorced from the realities and
pressures of war, where complete information is not available and
difficult decisions must be made quickly. Under military law, a
commander breaches Additional Protocol I when he knows an attack
will cause excessive incidental damage. Commanders must take
objectively reasonable precautions in light of the information available
at the time of the attack.255
Unlike the situation described in the Martic case, it does not appear
that the United States intentionally targeted civilians in Nis. Nonethe-
less, reports suggest that a multiple cluster bomb strike was planned.
While official reports mention the malfunction of a single cluster muni-
tion, Human Rights Watch reported cluster bomblets falling in three
widely separated areas. The distance between those areas is larger than
even the largest footprint reported for a CBU-87 (a square kilometer). A
multiple cluster strike in a civilian area, with a weapons with a known
dud rate of at least five percent, calls the proportionality calculation into
serious question. Again, Serbian forces bear some responsibility for lo-
cating a military target in a civilian area, but breaches of humanitarian
law by an opponent do not relieve the attacker of its legal obligations
with respect to the civilian population.256
The fact that the United States has acknowledged, in its after action
report, that submunitions do have a dud rate and "the need for early and
aggressive unexploded-ordnance clearing efforts" after the use of these
weapons, the case can be made for accountability not only for the im-
mediate deaths, but for those subsequent deaths as a result of
unexploded ordnance.
C. Anti-Terror Cluster Bombs: Russian
Use in the Chechen Wars
On October 23, 1999, Yusup Magomedov begged his mother to
let him go outside to play soccer in the Chechen village of Novi
Sharoi following days of confinement as a result of the war. A
few minutes later, an unexploded Russian cluster bomblet, fired
the day before, detonated and shredded his legs. Seven children
died in the explosion, and at least 15 were injured. A week later,
while Russian bombs rained down as Yusup and his mother
cowered in a cellar, doctors sharing their hiding place ampu-
255. Barfield, supra note 26, at 7-7.
256. Additional Protocol I, supra note 45, Art. 51(8).
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tated his gangrenous legs above the knees with a kitchen
knife.257
1. Battling Terrorists: Indiscriminate Cluster Bomb
Use During the Chechen Wars
Russian forces have used cluster munitions extensively in the
Chechen conflict, both during the 1994-96 war, as well as during the
recurrence of hostilities which began in September 1999.258 Reporting on
the use and effect of cluster bombs has been incidental to reporting on
other human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian
law by both sides of the conflict. While Russian leaders harshly criti-
cized the use of cluster munitions in Kosovo by NATO forces as banned
under international law, Russian forces have not hesitated to use cluster
munitions and other heavy weaponry indiscriminately against civilians.
In contrast to the NATO/Serbia conflict in Kosovo, where consider-
able independent investigation by unexploded ordnance removal
specialists has allowed for a growing body of literature concerning the
operation of NATO cluster munitions, there appears to be a dearth of
publicly available data concerning the use and lasting effects of Russian
or Chechen submunitions. Enough information has gotten out, however,
to know that Russian forces have dropped cluster bombs extensively
from the air and from multiple launch rocket systems.259
During the First Chechen War, Russian execution of the war
prompted considerable internal opposition. Russian casualties were
high, and neither the Russian army nor the general populace supported
the war.26 Early in the war, massive Russian aerial bombardment and
artillery had killed or injured thousands of civilians, with little to show
in the way of military advances. Cluster munitions clearly made up a
significant portion of the weaponry used.
Thousands of civilians are believed to have died in Grozny,
many of them from bomb attacks in which the Russian jets have
been using rockets and shells packed with nails and pellets that
257. Margaret Coker, Tragedy in Chechnya, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 6, 2000, at
C7.
258. For a strategic/military analysis of both Chechen wars, see Federation of Ameri-
can Scientists, Military Analysis Network, First Chechnya War: 1994-96, at
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-l01/ops/war/chechnyal.htm (January 15, 2000); Federation of
American Scientists, Military Analysis Network, Second Chechnya War: 1999-???, at
http://www.fas.org/man/dod- 1 01/ops/war/chechnya2.htm (September 11, 2000).
259. See, e.g., Fyodor Zavyalov, Federal Troops Pounding Guerilla Strongholds,
TASS, Sept. 7, 1999.
260. Michael McFaul, Russia Under Patin: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, J. DE-
MOCRACY, July 2000, at 21.
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do only surface damage to concrete buildings but rip through
anything or anybody else standing in the way.
A notable example early in the war was the January 3, 1995, cluster
munition bombardment of Shali, Chechnya. Two Russian jets hit a
roadside market first and then the hospital where wounded had been
taken. Also hit were a Muslim cemetery (while a funeral service was in
progress), the village school, and a collective farm. At least fifty-five
people were killed, and 186 were wounded. Zaur Musliyev, chief doctor
of the hospital, reported that five medics died when a bomb exploded in
the operating room, and that a new mother died when a bomb exploded
in the maternity ward (her baby survived). Journalists reported seeing
unexploded baseball sized bomblets in the hospital courtyard and in the
field around the roadside market. Residents reported that no Chechen
fighters were based in the village.262
Russian lawmaker Aivars Lezdinsk condemned the use of cluster
263bombs, claiming they were banned under the Geneva Conventions
Andrei Mironov, a former dissident and an aide to then presidential hu-
man rights commissioner Sergei Kovalyov, collected evidence of cluster
bombs and other ordnance early in the conflict, including a tennis ball
sized bomblet he found in Shali following the attack on January 3rd.
Mironov reported over a hundred people killed, higher than earlier esti-
mates, claiming they were nearly all civilians. "I remember, Soviet
propaganda spoke a lot about the Americans, how they were using such
weapons in Vietnam. But now they (the Russians) do the same," Miro-
nov said.2"
Khamsad Elmurzayev, a Chechen doctor in a field hospital south of
Grozny, underscored the grave injuries caused by cluster bombs:
261. David Filipov, In Grozny, Bombs Rain on Sole Source of Water, Moscow TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1995, available at LEXIS, All News, Moscow Times File.
262. Sonni Efron, Survivors Recall Brutal Assault on Chechen Town, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
5, 1995, at Al; James Meek, Harrowing Account of a Russian Attack, THE SCOTSMAN, Jan.
9, 1995, at 1; Rod Nordland, These People Can Never be Pacified, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16,
1995, at 28; James Rupert, Civilians Hit Despite Yeltsin Vow, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at
A22; Yeltsin Orders Halt to Air Raids over Grozny, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 5, 1995,
at A2.
263. Ron Laurenzo, Yelstin Lashes Out at Army Bombings, UPI, Jan. 6, 1995, available
at LEXIS, All News, UPI File.
264. Peter Graff & Graham Brown, Russian Activist Collects Bombs as Evidence
Against Moscow, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Goiti), Feb. 12, 1995, available at LEXIS, All
News, Agence France Presse File. Mironov described the bombs as weighing about 500
kilograms and containing hundreds of bomblets lined with steel pellets. He also displayed
evidence of dart bombs and incendiary bombs. That the victims were nearly all civilians
suggests that Chechen fighters may have been present. Id.
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"Hands and legs are tom off from the bombs, large body wounds from
the cluster bombs. It is terrible.,
265
Between 1997 and 1999, HALO Trust, a British humanitarian
agency, encountered landmines and unexploded submunitions from the
conflict in Chechnya, including the AO-2.5RT bomblet.66 The AO-
2.5RTM has been compared to the U.S. Rockeye cluster bomblet, being
an anti-personnel/anti-material submunition . 6 7 It weighs two-and-a-half
kilograms, measures 90 millimeters by 150 millimeters, and is as
"effective" as a single 81 millimeter mortar2 68 with a destructive area of
210 square meters. 26' Two Russian aircraft reported to be used exten-
sively in the Chechen conflict, the Su-24 and the Su-25, are both
capable of carrying bomb dispensers loaded with AO-2.5RT bomblets °
In January 1995, the European Union insisted on respect for inter-
national humanitarian law in the civil war in Chechnya. The Presidency
of the European Union issued a January 17, 1995 declaration stating:
The European Union is following the continuing fighting in
Chechnya with the greatest concern. The promised cease-fires
are not having any effect on the ground. Serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law are continuing.
The European Union strongly deplores the large number of vic-
tims and the suffering being inflicted on the civilian
population.
The European Union made an additional declaration on January 23,
1995:
265. Chechens Suffer Under Continued Russian Assault, CNN NEWS, Transcript No.
755-1. Dr. Elmurzayev's injury assessment echoes that of Dr. Grbic's in Pristina, Serbia. See
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
266. HALO Trust E-mail, supra note 30.
267. Russian Anti-Armour Bombs Detailed, INT'L DEF. REV., Dec. 1, 1992, at 1189.
268. FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 198. The AO-2.5RT designation is used with the
KMG-U dispenser, and the designation AO-2.5RTM is used with the RBK-500 dispenser.
The submunition is thought to be the same. JANE'S AIR LAUNCHED WEAPONS, Aug. 1, 1999,
at 1.
269. See Martin Mamula, Sukhoi's Su-37: A Smart Shturmovik?, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE
REV., August 1, 1997, at 346, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publica-
tions File.
270. Kenneth Munson, Gallery of Russian Aerospace Weapons, AIR FORCE MAO., Sept.
1998, at 87; Owen Matthews, The Sound and Fury of Russia's War in Chechnya, THE
SCOTSMAN, Oct. 13, 1999, at 12 [hereinafter Matthews, Sound and Fury]
271. Press Release 4215/95 (Presse II-G), General Secretariat, Council of the European
Union, Jan. 17, 1995, at 1, cited in Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, Decision on the De-
fence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm
(Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugosl., App. Div., Oct. 2, 1995).
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It deplores the serious violations of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law which are still occurring [in Chechnya].
It calls for an immediate cessation of the fighting and for the
opening of negotiations to allow a political solution to the con-
flict to be found. It demands that freedom of access to
Chechnya and the proper convoying of humanitarian aid to the
population be guaranteed.
The ICTY Appeals Tribunal in the Tadic case relied on these state-
ments in making its conclusions about the blurring of the lines between
international and internal conflicts and stressed that the above state-
ments "did not mention common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
but adverted to 'international humanitarian law,' thus clearly articulat-
ing the view that there exists a corpus of general principles and norms
on internal armed conflict embracing common Article 3 but having a
much greater scope." '73
Russian military actions in Chechnya enjoyed more widespread
Russian public support when the war broke out again in late 1999 than
during 1994-96, with the Russian people believing that "the rationale
for this war was self-defense," in light of apartment building bombings
in Moscow blamed on Chechen separatists. 74 The Russian army has re-
lied upon air power to an even greater extent than during the first war,275
possibly mimicking the air war strategy of NATO in the Kosovo crisis
earlier that year. Some commentators have argued that President Putin
entered a "Faustian" contract with the Russian army, giving them free
rein to conduct the war in any fashion that would guarantee him a war
victory.276
While Russian military leaders initially were reluctant to use air
strikes for fear of civilian casualties, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev
soon authorized massive air support for ground troops following heavy
initial troop losses. The Su-24M "Fencer-D" tactical strike aircraft and
the Su-25 "Frogfoot" again formed the core of Russian air offensives in
Chechnya. According to one analyst, the trend in aircraft and missile
272. Council of the European Union-General Secretariat, Press Release 4385/95 (Presse
24), Jan. 23, 1995, at 1, cited in Tadic, No. IT-94-1, http://www.un.org/icty/inde-e-htm, at
115.
273. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, http://www.un.org/icty/inde-e.htm, at I 116.
274. McFaul, Russia Under Putin, supra note 260, at 20-2 1. Public support for the war
during the presidential campaign of 2000 stood at 60%, even as casualties began to rise.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's public approval ratings were even higher. Id. at 21-22.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Stephen Blank, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Armed Forces: A Faustian
Bargain, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 2000, at 185-200.
277. Alexey Komorav, Chechen Conflict Drives Call for Air Force Modernization,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 14, 2000, at 80.
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strikes moved from unitary high explosive bombs and warheads (for
strategic targets such as bridges, roads and buildings) to wide-area anti-
personnel submunitions (to attack rebel leadership and camps).278 Over
60 tactical missiles, capable of carrying cluster submunitions, had been
used by mid-November 1999 in Chechnya."' A well-respected trade
journal reported in February 2000 that Russian short range ballistic mis-
210
siles have poor accuracy .
On October 7, 1999, two Su-24 fighter bombers dropped eight
cluster bombs on the village of Elistanzhi. The cluster bomb attack
killed over forty people, mostly women and children, and wounded
sixty. At least nine children were killed when one bomb hit the local
school. According to a Western journalist, "a trail of small bomb craters
300 [yards] long and 70 wide ran through the centre of the village-a
total of more than 200 detonations typical of cluster bombs designed to
inflict maximum casualties.,, 2 1 A nine-month-old baby lost a foot in the
attack."2 According to interviews conducted by Amnesty International
and Memorial (a Moscow-based human rights group), forty-eight civil-
ians died and over one hundred were injured. Among the dead was a
woman in her sixth month of pregnancy. Witnesses and victims "stated
that there were no Chechen fighters or military objectives in the village
prior to or at the time of the attack., 283 According to an eyewitness:
At 7:30 p.m., two airplanes very high up in the sky started to
bomb the village, at a time when people were gathering potatoes
and maize to be able to survive. Children, old men and the in-
firm were killed. Now the peaceful picturesque village among
the mountains is just a living grave.... 2 8 4
Human Rights Watch has consistently condemned indiscriminate
bombing by Russian forces in Chechnya. In April 2000, it made
recommendations to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, including
its own findings on bombing in Chechnya:
278. David A. Fulghum, Air War in Chechnya Reveals Mix of Tactics, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Feb. 14, 2000, at 76.
279. Isby, supra note 7.
280. Fulghum, supra note 278, at 77.
281. Matthews, Sound and Fury, supra note 270; Owen Matthews, A Fight for Honor?,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1999, at 23.
282. Owen Matthews, Battle Shy, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 1999, at 36.
283. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: CHECHNYA FOR THE MOTHER-
LAND-REPORTED GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter
CHECHNYA FOR THE MOTHERLAND], available at, http://www.amnestyinternational.org/
ai.nsf.
284. Id. at 5.
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Since the beginning of the conflict, Russian forces have indis-
criminately and disproportionately bombed and shelled civilian
areas, causing heavy civilian casualties. They have ignored their
Geneva Convention obligations to focus their attacks on com-
batants, and appear to take few safeguards to protect civilians.
The shelling of the Grozny market last autumn was but the first
example. In the months that followed a carpet-bombing cam-
paign of Grozny and many other towns and villages was
responsible for the vast majority of civilian deaths in the con-
flict in Chechnya. It has devastated many parts of Chechnya and
reduced the capital, Grozny, to a wasteland of rubble.285
Amnesty International has repeatedly called for international inves-
tigations into, among other issues, indiscriminate bombing attacks on
civilians.286
2. The Case of Grozny: A Cluster Warhead Goes to Market
On October 21, 1999, a Russian attack on the Grozny market killed
scores of civilians. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov claimed that
the attack had been aimed at the presidential palace and that the Rus-
sians had used a tactical missile with cluster bombs. He claimed 282
people were killed, while early reports had claimed about 150 deaths.287
According to HALO Trust, a British based humanitarian agency, 137
people were killed, and among the wounded was a International Red
Cross senior local administrator. HALO confirmed that the attack was
due to an "airburst device" from a SS-21 Tochka "Scarab" missile, not
an internal shootout as initially claimed by some Russian authorities.288
Russian officials charged that the Grozny market was an arms ba-
zaar. Independent sources did confirm that in one area of the market,
arms were sold but interviews with local residents indicated that it was a
general market as well, and one of the few remaining sources for food in
the area.289 HALO Trust confirmed the Amnesty International conclu-
sions that the market was not a weapons market per se:
285. Human Rights Watch, Recommendations to the UNHCR: Chechnya, http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/geneva/chechnya.htm (April 2000).
286. Press Release, Amnesty International, Chechnya: The Council of Europe Must
Support an International Investigation Into Human Rights Abuses, Apr. 3, 2000, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/news/2000/44602400.htm.
287. Russian Jets Pound Downtown Grozny, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 27,
1999, at A4.
288. HALO Trust E-mail, supra note 30.
289. CHECHNYA FOR THE MOTHERLAND, supra note 283, at 5.
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Grozny market ... is a great sprawling area of wooden stalls
laid out each morning and packed away in the evenings. It is the
equivalent of all your department stores rolled into one. Thus
you can buy fresh bread, a TV set, a wedding dress, a bag of
nails, and an AK-47 in one open area the size of a couple of
sports fields. Each section is clearly demarcated and the area
where weapons are sold is very small and set right against the
edge. The centre of destruction was in the central zone some
150m away from the area set aside for selling weapons. It was
right over the clothes and food section. With the use of such
munitions in such an area it was impossible not to have fore-
seen massive collateral damage. (If indeed, we believe that the
arms market was the target.).
290
The "official" Russian story changed several times. On October 22,
one Russian spokesperson on television claimed that there had been no
Russian military attacks on Grozny on October 21 and suggested the
explosions were caused by Chechen fighters. Also on October 22, 1999,
another Russian spokesperson, on another TV channel, claimed that a
Russian special operation had destroyed an arms market in Grozny, and
that if any civilians had been killed, it could only have been those in-
volved in selling arms to the "bandits." The Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin, also speaking on October 22 but in Helsinki, stated that an explo-
sion had occurred in a weapons market and that fighting between "two
warring bandit groups" might have been the cause. He did note that a
Russian special operation had occurred, but that it had "no connection to
the events which took place in Grozny." The spinning continued on
October 23, 1999, when the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of
the Russian Forces stated that there was a special operation by Russian
forces, which provoked combat between two rival bandit groups, who
then could have set off an explosion in an arms warehouse. 9'
On October 26, 1999, General Major Vladimir Shamanov, Com-
mander of the Russian Federal Forces "Zapad" said in a TV interview
that the explosions were the result of a Russian attack ordered at the
highest levels of command. On October 23, the President of Ingushetia,
General Major Ruslan Aushev (a professional military officer and vet-
eran of the Afghanistan war), dismissed the warehouse explosion
explanation and said that it was "clear that this was an attack with tacti-
cal rockets" as a result of "decisions made at the very top.
2 92
290. HALO Trust E-mail, supra note 30 (emphasis added).
291. CHECHNYA FOR THE MOTHERLAND, supra note 283, at 6-7.
292. Id. at 7.
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Amnesty International documented the human face of the tragedy.
Leila Migieva, aged 46, was traveling in a bus that was hit by flying
shrapnel from the attack, losing her left hand and left leg. Tousari
Esmurzayeva, whose daughter was wounded while selling bread in the
market, shared her eyewitness account:
After the first hit, I saw a man who was sitting in a car. His head
had been blown off, but his hands were still holding the wheel.
Corpses were everywhere in the market. They were lying on the
stalls .. 293
Fourteen-year-old Sulikhan Asukanova lost her right arm to ampu-
tation after being hit during an explosion during the attack. She was hit
at about 5 p.m.; the impact left her arm hanging off her body. Her
mother had to take her to three different hospitals before her arm was
finally cut off at 10 p.m.
29 4
The SS-21 "Scarab" Tochka ballistic missile used in the attack can
"blast a seven hectare area with cluster bombs." 295 When it went on the
market in 1993, the Tochka-U ("Improved Point") had a maximum
range of 120 kilometers, and claimed an accuracy of fifteen meters. It
can carry fifty submunitions. The claimed accuracy and reliability of
the Tochka-U, however, have recently come into question. The SS-21
was reported in February 2000 to have a "circular error probable" of
between 100 meters and 150 meters, rather than the earlier claim of fif-
teen meters.297
Amnesty International criticized the attack as a possible grave
breach of Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tions as an indiscriminate attack on civilians. Even though the arms
market may have been a legitimate target, the use of high explosive
293. Id. at 5.
294. Id. at 5-6.
295. Russia's Arms Industry: Ivan the Lethal, THE ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Mar. 25,
2000. A hectare is 10,000 square meters.
296. Christopher F. Ross, Russia Puts 'Pinpoint' Missile on the Market, JANE'S DEF.
WKLY., Aug. 21, 1993, at 9, available at LEXIS, Military Justice, Jane's Defence Publica-
tions File.
297. Fulghum, supra note 278. A recent test shot of a Ukrainian Tochka-U with a
dummy warhead hit an apartment building in a Kiev suburb on April 20, 2000 in the
Ukraine. Three people were killed and five injured. This "high-precision" rocket was built at
a Russian plant in 1990 and had an expected lifespan of 10 years. The commander of the
Ukrainian Missile Troops and Artillery stated that it was the will of God that the missile did
not hit the Chernobyl nuclear plant. Mikhail Melnik, Minister Confirms Apartment House
Blast, TASS, Apr. 24, 2000; Missile Missed Chernobyl By Will of God, (Ukrainian TV Sec-
ond Programme broadcast), reprinted in BBC WORLDWIDE MON. (Kiev), Apr. 25, 2000,
available at LEXIS, All News, BBC Worldwide Monitoring File.
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weapons in a market packed with civilians likely failed the principles of
discrimination and proportionality.298
Specifically, Article 51(5)(b) prohibits attacks which may be ex-
pected to cause incidental loss of civilian life ... in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." The attack also
seems to violate the principle that means and methods that cannot be
specifically targeted are not to be used. A weapon with a seven hectare
footprint hardly seems appropriate for the target described in the Grozny
market. Giving the Russian leaders who justified the attack the benefit
of the doubt, the situation does present a classic problem of targeting in
an urban setting where there is both "horizontal" proximity of civilians
and a military target. International law does not relieve a combatant of
its responsibility in such a situation to protect civilians to the extent
possible.299
These three case studies (Zagreb, Kosovo, and Chechnya) provide
compelling arguments for why the international community should re-
consider the indiscriminate and inhumane characteristics of cluster
munitions. They demonstrate that existing legal frameworks are inade-
quate to address the situation. In the first case, an indicted war crimes
suspect runs free; in the second, the lack of a clear norm prohibiting the
use of cluster munitions in civilian areas, let alone any explicit interna-
tional restrictions at all, serves as cover for NATO's questionable use of
cluster munitions; and in the third case, the lack of clear rules applying
to internal armed conflict, as well as the lack of a clear international
standard on the use of cluster munitions, will likely result in no action
being taken against those behind the bombing of the Grozny market and
other Chechen targets.
What can be done? Before suggesting a solution, perhaps we should
first look at past attempts to ban or restrict cluster bombs, and then con-
sider steps that can be taken.
V. A PROPOSAL TO BAN CLUSTER BOMBS
A. A Look Back: Past Efforts to Ban Cluster Bombs
This Section looks back at past efforts to ban or restrict cluster
bombs. Rather than merely provide a historical account, this Section
will counter past arguments and claims in defense of cluster munitions
with subsequently available factual information. The object is not to
298. CHECHNYA FOR THE MOTHERLAND, supra note 283, at 7.
299. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 16, art. 51(8); WAXMAN, supra note 22, at x.
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hold the past to today's standards, but to demonstrate that those argu-
ments no longer hold sway in light of subsequent battlefield experience.
1. Footprints to Nowhere in the 1970s: The Conventional
Weapons Treaty (CCW) Process
The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) re-
sulted from a process initiated in the early 1970s by the International
Committee of the Red Cross and states like Sweden concerned about the
damage done by new weapons being used in battlefields around the
world.3° The ICRC convened a conference of experts Lucerne, Swit-
zerland in 1975 to consider proposals to ban a number of anti-personnel
weapons, including cluster bombs.3"'
Governmental delegates opposed to a ban on cluster bombs, led by
the U.S., argued (1) that cluster bomblets were not that deadly0 2 and
(2) that cluster bomb footprints were not as large as claimed by Swedish
experts. A Dutch military expert attempted to debunk a Swedish claim
that the area coverage of a U.S. cluster bomb of the era was 300 meters
by 900 meters, stating that "the size of the area is classified but it is only
a fraction of that.,
303
Subsequent experience has shown that these efforts to debunk the
critics of cluster bombs can themselves be debunked. The devastating
nature of cluster bomb injuries from the Vietnam era, as well as ver-
sions in use today, seems indisputable. A U.S. Army medic had the
following to say about cluster bomb injuries during the Gulf War:
The devastation [cluster bomblets] caused on explosion was un-
believable. Shrapnel flew everywhere. Limbs were severed by
300. PROKOSCH, supra note 16, at 148. A panel of Swedish military and medical experts
produced a report on these weapons in 1973, and formed the technical background for the
conference. Id.
301. Id. at 149-50.
302. According to an American expert at the conference, "The pellets don't have a
strong penetration capability, so the [military] crews are protected. So are civilians if they
take cover, as they almost always do." Id. at 151. He also said that "even very light shelters
would offer protection to any civilians near the target." INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS (LUCERNE) 54 (1975) [hereinafter ICRC, 1975 LUCERNE CONF.].
303. Id. Eric Prokosch, a Quaker observer at the meeting, raised the fact that a B-52
bomber could drop over 77,000 M40 grenades in a single run, the comment was ignored by
delegates. When this issue was raised again at the follow up conference in Lugano the fol-
lowing year, a U.S. delegate doubted that such a capability even existed. Id., at 151-52.
Footprints of some current cluster bombs are three times larger than 300 meters by 900 me-
ters. See, e.g., PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at 5 (1000 meter
by 1000 meter footprint).
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the force of detonation. Massive abdominal bleeding and pul-
monary pressure wounds occurred.3 4
A few anecdotes of injuries caused by Vietnam era cluster bomblets
in Laos underscore the point. On November 22, 1993, four-year-old
Kou Ya and his seven-year-old sister Sia Ya were killed when they were
playing with a cluster bomblet While tilling the family rice paddy
behind a water buffalo in May 1996, fifteen-year-old Ton Kemla's plow
hit a long-hidden cluster bomblet that exploded and ripped apart his
genitals.3 6 On February 28, 1995, a Mr. Khammone was cutting bamboo
when his knife struck a bombie, causing it to explode. He died one day
later. Three boys nearby suffered leg injuries.3 7
While there may be some dispute as to footprint sizes of different
cluster bombs, claims made by government delegates in the 1970s have
been proven overly conservative. A U.K. Royal Air Force captain
claimed at Lucerne in 1975, for instance, that the newly developed
BL755 cluster bomb covered an area "less than one hectare," or less
than 100 meters by 100 meters.3 8 Twenty-five years later, NATO ad-
mitted in a meeting with British parliamentarians that each cluster bomb
is considered to cover a square kilometer of area, i.e., 1000 meters by
1000 meters,3" or 100 times the area claimed in 1975. As noted above,
the United Kingdom dropped over 530 RBL755 or BL755 cluster
bombs in Kosovo.3 °
The ongoing damage caused by unexploded cluster bomblets appar-
ently was not discussed at the conference; indeed, the same Royal Air
Force captain mentioned above virtually guaranteed that duds would not
304. Ginn, supra note 112.
305. Kou was killed instantly. Sia died two days later. MENNONNITE CENTRAL COM-
MITTEE & MINES ADVISORY GROUP, SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
PROJECT, XIENG KHOUANG, LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, undated (on file with
author).
306. Catherine Toups, Vietnam War Still Takes Toll on Laos: Unexploded Bombs Often
Maim, Kill, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 1996, at A19.
307. MAG fax message XK-UXO 3.26, Accident Reports 20 February-I March 1995,
from Don MacDonald to Rae McGrath, April 16, 1995, in MCC/MAG UNEXPLODED OR-
DANCE REMOVAL PROJECT-XIENG KHOUANG, LAO PDR MONTHLY REPORT I MARCH-30
APRIL 1995 (on file with author).
308. PROKOSCH, supra note 16, at 154.
309. PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at T 5.
310. The prefix RBL "relates to a variation of the BL755 equipped with a radar prox-
imity fuze which initiates the dispenser case ejection at a pre-set height to enable
deployment from medium-to-high altitude." MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 51, n. 121. In other
words, the RBL755 is a BL755 which can be dropped from a higher altitude, without neces-
sarily altering footprint size.
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occur in the new British BL755 cluster bomb.3 ' Seven years later, the
much vaunted BL755 fuzing system failed dramatically under combat
conditions. According to U.K. government sources, at least 9.5% of all
BL755 cluster bomblets dropped on Argentine forces in the Falkland
Islands in 1982 failed to explode on contact.
These arguments will not likely be repeated at upcoming confer-
ences addressing the issue of cluster bombs. It is important, however, to
understand that government and manufacturer guarantees often prove
deficient in the face of actual battlefield experience. Even claims made
in good faith often prove erroneous in light of the real effects. The next
new and improved weapon will often fail to live up to expectations.
The Lucerne Conference was followed in 1976 by the Lugano Con-
ference, at which thirteen countries proposed a ban on cluster weapons:
Anti-personnel cluster warheads or other devices with many
bomblets which act through the ejection of a great number of
small-calibred fragments or pellets are prohibited for use.33
Those supporting the ban argued that:
[Cluster warheads] had a wide area coverage and, hence, could
easily affect combatants and civilians without discrimination;
they also caused unnecessary suffering, ensuing inter alia from
the multiple wounds they often inflicted. Another ground ad-
vanced was the public concern which the use of these weapons
had aroused3 4
311. He stated that "the fusing of the bomblets is such that detonation on impact is as-
sured regardless of the angle at which the bomblet strikes the target or ground, and that the
incidence of in-flight bomblet detonation is extremely small, so that the effects of the weapon
are contained within the designated area and at the attack time." ICRC, 1975 LUCERNE
CONF., supra note 302, at 54 (emphasis added).
312. U.K. government sources indicate that the dud rate for the BL755 when used in
the Falklands War was at least 9.5%. John Spellar, M.P., Minister of State, to Harry Cohen,
M.P., MoD Ref: D/Min(AF)/JS PQ1886K/00/M (May 28, 2000), cited in MCGRATH, supra
note 1l, at 28.
313. WORKING PAPER: INCENDIARY WEAPONS, ANTI-PERSONNEL FRAGMENTATION
WEAPONS, SMALL-CALIBRE PROJECTILES, ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES, No. CDDH/IV/201,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROS, CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT
EXPERTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (LUGANO) 198-99 (1976)
[hereinafter ICRC, 1976 LUGANO CONF.]. This paper was submitted to the CDDH by Alge-
ria, Austria, Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Norway, Sudan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id. As evidenced in the title of the proposal, efforts
were made to ban incendiary weapons and to limit other weapons, including, flechettes,
certain types of bullets, and air-dropped anti-personnel landmines. Id.
314. ICRC, 1976 LUGANO CONF., supra note 313, at 17, $ 45.
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As far-reaching as the proposed ban was, it did not cover bomblets
designed for anti-materiel use or combined effects munitions,35 an ex-
ception that, in light of currently used submunitions, would have
swallowed the rule.
Opponents of the ban made a number of arguments. They were
"convinced that weapons of this category represented an improvement
from the humanitarian point of view over weapons with random
fragmentation." Others argued that there was a need for anti-personnel
wide-area munitions in defensive situations. 3 6 A suggestion to limit
footprint size to one square kilometer met with the criticism that the
result would be simply to increase the number of warheads targeted to
the target area.3 7 Referring to ongoing parallel negotiations on the laws
of war (that would lead eventually to Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions), one expert argued there was no need to consider
weapons characteristics per se, but that cluster warheads should be
assessed in light of use prohibitions related to indiscriminate attacks.3
These objections found response in the explanatory memorandum
attached to the proposed ban:
At detonation a vast number of small fragments or pellets are
dispersed evenly covering a large area with a high degree of
probability of hitting any person in the area. The effect of such a
detonation on unprotected persons-military or civilian-in the
comparatively large target area is almost certain to be severe
with multiple injuries caused by many tiny fragments. Multiple
injuries considerably raise the level of pain and suffering. They
often call for prolonged and difficult medical treatment and the
cumulative effect of the many injuries increases the mortality
risk.... It has been suggested that cluster bomb units may have
indiscriminate effects not because of their construction but
rather because of their operational use. However, when the
normal weapon effect is to cover areas of several square kilo-
meters in an attack by a single aircraft, these weapons are
hardly capable of use anywhere without hitting civilians inci-
dentally.319
These conferences fed into a process resulting in the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
315. Id. at 17, 204.
316. Id. at 17,146.
317. Id. at 17,147.
318. Id. A central thesis of this Article is that those norms have proven ineffective in
regulating cluster munitions in the subsequent twenty-five years.
319. Id. at 204.
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Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 20 known more customarily
as the Conventional Weapons Treaty (CCW). The cluster bomb ban did
not make it into the final treaty, nor were any restrictions on their use
included.
Protocol II of the CCW did address the issue of landmines, restrict-
ing their indiscriminate use. It was generally understood that the
definition of landmines did not include cluster bombs.32 Protocol III
prohibited the intentional use of incendiary weapons against civilians
and also prohibited use against any military objective located in a con-
centration of civilians. 22 While probably the most far-reaching part of
the CCW, Protocol III was carefully drafted to exclude any cluster
bombs that might have an incendiary side effect. According to Protocol
III, incendiary weapons do not include:
Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast, or fragmen-
tation effects with an additional incendiary effect, such as
armour-piercing projectiles, fragmentation shells, explosive
bombs and similar combined-effects munitions in which the in-
cendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause burn injury
to persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as
armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities.
3 23
Combined effects munitions in the form of the BLU-97 submunition
(the bomblet dispensed by the CBU-87), the star of the show in Kosovo,
are therefore not covered by Protocol III of the CCW, even though they
are designed to pack an incendiary punch through the zirconium com-
ponent.32
320. Restrictions or bans on specific weapons were considered in the discussions in
1976 and 1977 of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, but no action was
taken beyond recommending that a separate treaty process be undertaken. This recommen-
dation led to U.N. preparatory committee meetings in 1979 and 1980, and the CCW Treaty
in 1980. PROKOSCH, supra note 16, at 160.
321. The definition of mine under Protocol II is "any munitions placed under, on, or
near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the pres-
ence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle." Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (1980 Protocol II), art. 2(1), in CCW,
supra note 5. The Protocol had no definition of anti-personnel landmines.
322. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, art. 2,
in CCW, supra note 5.
323. Id. at art. I(1)(b)(ii).
324. Walker & Stambler, supra note 9. The U.S. did not consent to be bound by Proto-
col III of the CCW, even with these exceptions for cluster munitions explicitly written into
the text. The U.S. has taken the position that the prohibition on attacks on military targets in
civilian areas eliminates the attacker's normal considerations of proportionality, i.e., that the
use of incendiaries may result in fewer civilian casualties than conventional weapons. W.
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The role of the public conscience in the formation of the treaty can-
not be underplayed, but this also has limits. Napalm grabbed the public
conscience through the power of the iconic photo of the Vietnamese girl
running naked toward the camera; the resulting outrage affected the
CCW and its Protocol III on incendiary weapons.3 25 But it is difficult to
326gauge what constitutes the public conscience, and the public seems
capable only of limited outrage at any given moment.
In sum, the cluster bombs failed to make it into the CCW for several
reasons. Militaries in powerful countries were committed to justifying
their continued use, and this justification often took the form of
"debunking" opposing data about the extent and severity of cluster mu-
nition damage. Negative effects of cluster bombs were downplayed.
Combined effects munitions with anti-personnel effects were protected
"definitionally"-in the original Swedish proposal to ban cluster bombs,
combined effects munitions were exempt. In Protocol III covering in-
cendiary weapons, CEMs were again exempted. Other weapons
systems, most notably napalm, grabbed the spotlight as somehow more
heinous than cluster bombs. Finally, the long term effects of unexploded
cluster bombs were not widely known at the time.
2. Banning Some Hidden Killers, Forgetting Others: The March to the
1997 Ottawa Mines Ban Treaty
By the early 1990s, growing awareness of the humanitarian crisis
caused by anti-personnel landmines led to a movement to ban their
use.3 27 A number of states, under pressure and encouragement from the
burgeoning International Campaign to Ban Landmines, called for a re-
view of the Conventional Weapons Treaty to take up the issue of anti-
personnel landmines. The provisions of the 1980 Protocol II had clearly
failed to stop the widespread use of mines in the 1980s, and there was
growing support for a ban on their use, production, transfer, and stock-
piling. Following a series of preparatory committee meetings, the States
Parties to the CCW gathered in Geneva in September 1995. An un-
precedented number of non-governmental activists joined governmental
Hays Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 279 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 535, 548
(1990).
325. PROKOSCH, supra note 16, at 170. At the 1974 Lucerne Conference, Hans Blix of
the Swedish delegation invoked this image in exhorting delegates to action. Id.
326. Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of
Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 85 (2000).
327. See, e.g., SHAWN ROBERTS & JODY WILLIAMS, AFTER THE GUNS FALL SILENT:
THE ENDURING LEGACY OF LANDMINES (1995).
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delegates. Two issues seized the conference: anti-personnel landmines
and blinding lasers. 8
Cluster bombs again were on the back burner at Geneva. The issue
had been raised in the ICRC expert meeting in May-June 1994. The
Australian government "non-paper" pointed out the problem of
unexploded cluster bomblets and suggested self-destruct mechanisms as
a way to cut down on the problem. A non-governmental expert made
several proposals short of a total ban: banning fragmentation cluster
munitions, as well as attacks with multiple cluster munitions where area
coverage is above a certain limit; requiring self-destruct or self-
neutralizing mechanisms on bomblets; setting a maximum permitted
delay time for time delay fuzes on bomblets; and banning cluster
munitions attacks where there is a high likelihood of civilian
casualties.329 In light of the extensive use of cluster weapons in the Gulf
War, one might have expected even greater attention to the issue.330
The cluster bomb proposals failed to go much further. The Interna-
tional Campaign to Ban Landmines explicitly rejected calling for the
ban on landmines to include cluster bombs, doing so first in Rome in
1995 and most recently in 1999. Some within the campaign have argued
for inclusion of cluster bombs in an effects-based definition of land-
mines. Those opposed to the ICBL taking up the issue have argued that
such an effort would require a new campaign and would detract from
the efforts at universalizing and implementing the MBT.33 In September
1999, the ICBL Coordinating Committee (ICBL CC) released a position
statement stating that the "ICBL as a whole must stay focused on its call
for a global ban on APMs [anti-personnel mines] and should not expand
it to include a ban on cluster bombs. 332 Put most bluntly, the position of
the ICBL was based more on a pragmatic assessment that including
cluster bombs under a landmine definition might well scuttle hopes of a
landmine ban.
328. Author's Notes from 1995 CCW Conference (on file with author). I served as the
Mennonite Central Committee representative to the CCW conferences in Geneva in Septem-
ber 1995, Vienna in May 1996, and in Geneva in December 1999 and December 2000.
329. PROKOSCH, supra note 16, at 200 n.52.
330. The fact that cluster bombs were used against a tyrant who annexed a neighboring
country and visited systematic human rights violations on opponents in his own country no
doubt reduced international sympathy for the victims of unexploded bomblets in Iraq. An
unprecedented clearance effort also occurred in Kuwait, where ample financing resulted in
record time clean-up, which also likely served to diminish the international impact. For an
account of unexploded ordnance clearance efforts in Kuwait, at a cost of nearly $1 billion,
see DONAVAN WEBSTER, AFTERMATH: THE REMNANTS OF WAR 218-252 (1996).
331. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Minutes of Coordinating Committee,
Sept. 11-12, 1999, Geneva, Switzerland (on file with author) [hereinafter ICBL, 1999 Min-
utes].
332. Id.
[Vol. 22:85
Footprints of Death
The September 1995 CCW review conference ended in turmoil, as
government delegates could not come to agreement on a proposal to
restrict anti-personnel mines.333 The delegates reconvened in Vienna in
May 1996, and landmine ban advocates were disappointed that the
agreements reached there fell short of a comprehensive landmine ban.
The 1996 Amended Protocol II of the CCW instead required all anti-
personnel landmines to have self-destruct or self-deactivate mecha-
nisms, and that they be "detectable." It also defined an antipersonnel
mine as "a mine primarily designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill
one or more persons.
The failure of the CCW delegates to agree to a complete ban of
landmines led to the initiation of a new treaty process to call for a com-
prehensive ban. This treaty process, which developed out of an
unprecedented cooperation between international non-governmental
organizations and sympathetic states, culminated in the Ottawa Mines
Ban Treaty signed in December 1997."'5 Cluster munitions played only a
minor role in the process. The proponents of a comprehensive ban
worked for clarity and simplicity, opting out of a complex compliance
333. See, e.g., Paul Quinn-Judge, No Ban on Landmines as U.N. Meeting Ends, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1995.
334. Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices (1996 Amended Protocol I1), Art. 2, 4 & 5 in CCW, supra note 5.
These revisions were criticized by landmine ban advocates as actually promoting the contin-
ued use of landmines: "[r]ather than stigmatizing all AP mines as indiscriminate killers of
civilians or as toxic contaminants, the new Protocol encouraged nations to use mines said to
have less impact on civilian populations." Roberts, supra note 140, at 378. Roberts also
argues that insertion of the word "primarily" into the definition of an AP landmine opens a
loophole for using anti-tank mines with anti-handling devices. Id. at 378-79 The head of the
U.S. delegation to the CCW, Michael Matheson, disputes the notion that partial measures of
the CCW "'legitimiz[e]' the use of mines falsely considered safe or 'smart,'" arguing that
many Western governments are moving towards support of a total ban. He also argues that
Russia, China, India, & Pakistan are unlikely to join a total ban, and that partial steps are
better than none at all. Michael Matheson, Current Development: The Revision of the Mines
Protocol, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 158, 166 (1997).
335. Ken Rutherford has argued that a clear distinction exists between treaties calling
for bans of weapons, and those calling for restrictions. He directly contrasts the CCW (which
he characterized as largely a failure) and the MBT (a success). Ken Rutherford, The Hague
& Ottawa Conventions: A Model for Future Weapon Ban Regimes?, NONPROLIF. REV.,
Spring/Summer 1999, at 36, 46. What that argument fails to consider is the dynamic that was
created by the CCW process. "Shadow" meetings and briefings, held by NGOs in the U.N.
buildings concurrently with the CCW official delegates meetings, proved to be the incuba-
tors for the MBT process. NGO representatives and delegates of friendly states plotted out
the early strategies for the Ottawa process during the CCW conference itself. See Author's
Notes from 1996 CCW Conference (April, 1996) (on file with author). Rather than sharply
contrasting the two treaties, one should view the MBT as arising, Phoenix-like, from the
ashes of the CCW.
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regime. Including cluster bombs, as noted above, would have compli-
cated the process and threatened chances for success.
The United States did not seriously join the negotiations until the
summer of 1997, late in the process. The United States expressed con-
cern over the proposed (and eventual) MBT definition of an
antipersonnel mine as "a mine designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill
one or more persons," '336 thus deleting the word "primarily" from the
CCW definition. This caused some concern at the U.S. Department of
Defense, because if "you took the existing land mine ban definition,
without that primarily in there it could be, in fact, stretched to include
th[e] high unexploded ordnance rate" of cluster bomb units found in
Laos.337 Such fears about the definition were unfounded, as most peo-
ple close to the process believe that the current definition found in the
MBT does not include cluster bomblets.338
While cluster bombs were excluded from both the amended CCW
and the new MBT, significant advances were made in raising awareness
of the issue. That unexploded cluster bomblets function as de facto
landmines is now largely undisputed, a significant advance over the
331situation internationally 25 years ago.
B. Another Opportunity: The 2001 CCW Review Conference
The Conventional Weapons treaty comes up for a 5 year review in
2001 .3" This event provides an opportunity for the international com-
336. MBT, supra note 3, art. 2, 1.
337. U.S. DOD Background Briefing, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 3, 1997, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1997/. Probably a more pressing basis for U.S. opposi-
tion to an outright ban was the situation on the demilitarized zone in Korea. Id.
338. The Travaux Preparatoire for the MBT process has yet to be produced. Report-
edly, the Norwegian government accepted responsibility for producing it, but has failed to do
so. Author's Notes from December 1999 Annual Review Conference of the CCW (on file
with author). Conversations by the author with governmental and non-governmental dele-
gates closely involved in the negotiation of the MBT treaty, however, strongly suggest that
cluster bombs were not intended to be included in the definition. See supra note 37 for a
discussion of this question.
339. See e.g. WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY SWITZERLAND: REGULATION ON
SUBMUNITIONS, FIRST PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE OF
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE
OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJU-
RIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS, Dec. 14, 2000 (on file with author) [hereinafter
SWISS CCW WORKING PAPER].
340. Declaration on the Occasion of the First Annual Conference of States Parties to
Amended Protocol II to The CCW, Dec. 17, 1999, Geneva Office, United Nations, available
at http://www.unog.ch/disarm/review/ccwdec.htm (last visited June 20, 2000).
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munity to revisit the question of cluster bombs, and to account for their
indiscriminate use and inherently indiscriminate characteristics.
There are clearly pitfalls. The CCW process has definite limitations.
Powerful nations have expressed little interest in cluster munitions re-
strictions. The United States sees the CCW review as an opportunity to
expand on the restrictions of Amended Protocol II concerning land-
141mines. Pakistan and China have expressed strong opposition to any
changes, arguing that the 1996 changes should be better implemented
and studied.34 ' The landmines ban movement, while facing significant
opposition from the world's militaries, did not pose a significant threat
to arms manufacturers as mines did not constitute a major portion of
their income and thus did not provoke a counter-campaign.343 Cluster
munitions, on the other hand, are a growing multi-billion dollar enter-
prise at the core of national military strategy and military-industrial
research, development, and production.3' 4
But there are countervailing signs of action. Cluster bombs have the
potential of becoming what napalm was in the 1970s and landmines
were in the 1990s. The irony of a humanitarian campaign to stop geno-
cide in Kosovo resulting in returning refugee children being killed and
maimed by unexploded cluster bomblets has galvanized international
opinion in a way that scores more deaths Laos and Chechnya have been
unable to do. The International Committee for the Red Cross hosted a
conference for government and non-governmental experts in September
2000 to consider "Unexploded Remnants of War," including cluster
bombs, in anticipation of the 2001 CCW Review conference.3 45 Legis-
lators in the United States have expressed an interest in restricting
cluster bombs.) While falling short of calling for expansion of the mine
341. U.S. Calls for Action in Making all Mines Detectable to Ease Clearance, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (Geneva), May 30, 2000, available at LEXIS, All News, Agence France
Presse File.
342. Author's Notes of Plenary Session of Annual Review of Amended Protocol II of
the CCW, Geneva, Dec. 17, 1999 (on file with author).
343. Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of In-
ternational Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, II
EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 106 (2000).
344. See, e.g., U.S. GAO, Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan, supra note 87. (indicating
over $17 billion dollars allocated for anti-armor weapons, many of which are cluster muni-
tions).
345. ICRC, NYON SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 22.
346. On July 22, 1999, U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) proposed an ulti-
mately unsuccessful amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill, H.R. 2561, calling for a
complete cessation of funding for cluster bomb procurement. (Floor statements and amend-
ment on file with author). In December 1998, Representatives Rob Portman, Steve Chabot &
John Boehner urged the Secretary of Defense to require self-destruct fuzes on submunitions.
Letter from Reps. Rob Portman, Steve Chabot, & John Boehner, to William Cohen, Secre-
tary of Defense, Dec. 18, 1998 (on file with author). In 1999, Senator Patrick Leahy
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ban to include cluster bombs, the Coordinating Committee of the Inter-
national Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has recognized "the grave
danger posed to civilians by cluster bomb 'duds.' These duds do func-
tion as de facto antipersonnel landmines. The ICBL condemns the use
of cluster bombs and all indiscriminate weapons with antipersonnel
mine effect." '347 A growing number of international non-governmental
organizations have been calling for a moratorium on the use of cluster
bombs or for other restrictions.348
Governmental actions have indicated a move in this direction as
well. At the annual review of the Amended Protocol II of the CCW in
December 1999, Switzerland called for consideration of a cluster bomb
protocol,349 and renewed its concerns about unexploded cluster submu-
nitions at the first preparatory committee ("prepcom") for the 2001
CCW review held in December 2001." Other states, including Norway,
Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand have expressed
addressed the Senate and expressed concern over unexploded cluster bomblets in Kosovo.
See 145 CONG. REC. S 10,070 (Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
347. ICBL, 1999 Minutes, supra note 331.
348. MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 54 (describing the August 2000 call for a moratorium
and post-use clearance and damages by the U.K. Working Group on Landmines (now known
as Landmine Action UK), a consortium of 55 British non-governmental organizations);
Elisabeth Reusee-Decrey, Coordinator of the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, Preamble
to 1998 Annual Report (on file with author) (calling for efforts to combat arms that carry a
different name, but produce the same effects as anti-personnel landmines); HRW, Cluster
Bombs, supra note 203 (calling for a moratorium on use of cluster bombs in late 1999);
Mines Action Canada, Statement on Use of Mines & Similar Weapons in Yugoslavia/Kosovo,
May 10, 1999 (expressing concern about cluster bomb use in Kosovo in May, 1999), avail-
able at http://www.minesactioncanada.condocuments/letter.htm; New Zealand Campaign
Against Landmines (CALM), The Curse of Cluster Bombs, CALM NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1999,
at 5 (calling for a ban on "defective" cluster bombs and a 99.5% reliability rate). The Men-
nonite Central Committee, a long proponent of a comprehensive ban on cluster bombs, has
also issued a call for a moratorium on the use, production, sale, and transfer of cluster
bombs; some 40 international NGO's have signed onto this call as of late January 2001. See
Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb website, at http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb;
E-mail from Titus Peachey, Peace Education Director, MCC to Virgil Wiebe, Center for
Applies Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law Center (Feb. 14, 2001) (on file with
author).
349. Drclaration de la Ddlrgation Suisse, Premiere Confdrence Annuelle des Etats Par-
ties au Protocole II Rdvis6 de la Convention de 1980 sur Certaines Armes Conventionnelles
(December 15, 1999) (on file with author).
350. Ddclaration de Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Christian Faessler, Reprdsentant perma-
nent de la Suisse aupr~s de ]a Conference du Dtsarmament, Premier Comit6 Prdparatoire
pour la Conference d'Examen de la Convention de 1980 sur Certaines Armes Convention-
nelles, Gen~ve, Dec. 14, 2000, at 2 (on file with author). The Canadian Ambassador also
called on the government delegates to the CCW to begin addressing the issue in 2001.
Statement of Canada, Second Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Pro-
tocol 11 to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, Geneva, Dec. I1, 2000 (on file with author).
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interest in joining such an effort."' The U.K. consideration to end use of
air-dropped cluster bombs "can be seen as a technical response to the
'growing clamour' in the U.K." about the humanitarian impact of clus-
ter bombs.352 At the December 2000 CCW prepcom, a proposal
presented by the Netherlands and co-sponsored by 25 other countries
called upon the CCW to set aside time in the 2001 CCW agenda to dis-
cuss "the humanitarian impact of various unexploded remnants of war"
passed without opposition."'
1. Technical Fixes, Use Restrictions and Post Conflict
Accountability Measures: Too Little, Too Late?
A smorgasbord of options are under consideration, with specific
proposals being floated. These fall into the categories of technical fixes,
restrictions on use, and accountability measures following the use of
submunitions. Specific provisions have been suggested by the Interna-
tional Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss government.
At the Nyon Experts meeting it hosted in September 2000, the ICRC
presented papers on the global effects of cluster munitions and pre-
sented proposals to address the issue of unexploded remnants of war.
Rather than addressing the problem only weapon by weapon, the ICRC
urged a comprehensive approach. As part of that approach, the ICRC
made the following recommendations:
1. The use of cluster bombs and other types of submunitions
against military objectives in populated areas should be
prohibited (as is the case with incendiary weapons under
Protocol III of the CCW).
2. Responsibility for the clearance of all unexploded ordnance
should be assigned to those who have used them (as is the
351. Author's Notes from CCW Review Conference (December 1999) (on file with
author). As with the landmines ban movement, one motivation for medium-size powers may
be to see such an effort as a "counterweight to the political hegemony of the United States."
Anderson, supra note 343, at 107. In their November 2000 response to a parliamentary in-
quiry about cluster bomb use in Kosovo, the Dutch Defence and Foreign Ministries
expressed an interest in developing a legal framework to address the issue. Dutch Cluster
Bomb Memorandum, supra note 37.
352. PARLIAMENTARY/NATO CLUSTER MEETING, supra note 8, at T 11. Such a decision
shows the direct impact of public conscience and the Martens Clause on governmental deci-
sion making.
353. Non-paper on Explosive Remnants of War, presented by the Netherlands and co-
sponsored by Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cambodia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States, undated (on file
with author). See also E-mail from Peter Herby to Virgil Wiebe, Center for Applied Legal
Studies, Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 23, 2001) (on file with author).
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case for landmines under Amended Protocol II of the
CCW).
3. Technical information concerning the location, dangers,
detection and destruction should be made available to the
UN and demining bodies immediately after the end of hos-
tilities.
4. Warning of the threat posed by UXO should be given to ci-
vilians immediately after their use (as is the case for
remotely delivered landmines in Amended Protocol II of the
CCW).
5. Cluster bomblets and other submunitions should be fitted
with mechanisms which will ensure their self-destruction
immediately after the device fails to explode upon impact as
designed.
6. The use of cluster bomblets should be suspended until an
agreement on their use and clearance has been achieved.3 4
A representative of Human Rights Watch (HRW) also presented at
the meeting, and supported the call for a moratorium on the use of clus-
ter munitions while the issues are being studied. HRW also supported
exploring the possibility of self-destruct mechanisms and the prohibi-
tion of use in populated areas. HRW also called for the need for
accurate mapping, user responsibility regarding clearance, and warnings
to civilians."' A representative from Landmine Action UK also pre-
sented, supporting the position of the ICRC and also calling for
additional training of military personnel in the effects of submunitions.
Landmines Action UK also called for compensation to civilian victims
for death, injury, and economic disadvantage for the inability to use
land.356
At the December 2000 prepcom of the CCW treaty, the Swiss dele-
gation submitted a working paper addressing the issue of unexploded
submunitions. The proposal calls for technical fixes and stockpile de-
commissioning. Specifically, it calls for all future production of
submunitions to include a fuze mechanism which ensures deactivation
and self-destruction of all explosives to at least 98%. Such requirements
would go into force three years after entry into force. Use of stockpiled
submunitions not meeting those technical standards would be limited to
354. ICRC, 2000 CLUSTER BOMBS & LANDMINES REPORT, supra note 179, at 39. See
also ICRC, NYON SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 22, at 13-17.
355. Id. 22, at 8-9.
356. Id. at 9-10; see also MCGRATH, supra note 11, at 54.
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"an absolute minimum" during an as yet unspecified period of time
("xy" years), and such submunitions would be decommissioned some
time after that (in "xy + z" years). 57
These proposals are commendable. The ICRC approach relies on ref-
erence to existing norms of international humanitarian law to address both
the problems associated with immediate use of cluster bombs and the hu-
manitarian crises associated with unexploded ordnance. The prohibition
on use in populated areas, drawing on a similar prohibition on incendiary
weapons, addresses some of the problems associated with poor targeting
and wide-area coverage. The definition of "concentrations of civilians"
found in Protocol III, however, focuses on cities, towns, villages, and
refugee camps, and does little to protect populations in rural areas.358 One
of the lessons of the bombing of Laos is that much of the immediate and
ongoing damage from cluster bombs occurred in the countryside. While
laudable for restricting the use of cluster munitions in populated areas,
the ICRC proposal does not fully address the wide-area nature of cluster
bomb footprints, namely that multiple munitions that spread death and
destruction inherently cannot be directed at point targets.
The proposals to reduce failure rates seem the ideal technical fix-
cutting down on UXO cuts down on post-conflict casualties. Such
claims should, however, be viewed with considerable skepticism. In-
dustry spokespersons have for decades been promising lower dud rates
359
on cluster bombs, only to be proven wrong in actual combat usage.
Self-destruct and self-deactivate systems in the Gulf War often failed to
function, leaving behind live UXO. 6° The Swiss proposal of 98% fails
even to reach the reliability level of 99.9% mandated by Amended Pro-
tocol II of the CCW for anti-personnel landmines. T6
Stockpile destruction of high failure rate munitions should occur rap-
idly. The cost of retrofitting existing stocks in prohibitive. The Swiss
proposal does not go far enough in addressing the problems associated
with massive stockpiles of submunitions. The calls for clearance account-
ability, post-conflict information sharing, and victim compensation
357. Swiss CCW WORKING PAPER, supra note 339.
358. The term "concentration of civilians" is defined as "any concentration of civilians,
be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cites, or inhabited towns or sil-
lages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads." CCW,
supra note 5, Protocol III, art. 1(2).
359. See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Casualties
Caused by Improper Handling of Unexploded U.S. Submunitions, GAO/NSIAD-93-212,
August 1993, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/sudocs/aces/aces I 60.shtml.
360. ICRC, SUBMUNITIONS, supra note 11, at 18.
361. CCW, supra note 5, Amended Protocol II, Tech. Annex, art. 3(a).
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deserve serious consideration and support.362 In the end, however, these
measures do not go far enough. The restraints of international humani-
tarian law have proven insufficient to limit the immediate danger of
cluster munitions in the past. The promises of manufacturers and mili-
taries as to reductions in dud rates have proven hollow.
2. Ban the Bomblets: A Call for a Comprehensive Ban on
Explosive Cluster Submunitions
A comprehensive ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and trans-
fer of cluster munitions should be effectuated. Cluster bombs are
difficult to target, their footprints are very large, their use in populated
areas hazardous, and their dud rates unacceptably high. Unexploded
cluster bombs are "super landmines": when hidden, they function like
mines, but with a more deadly explosive charge,363 and when visible,
they attract the unsuspecting to pick them up. Each of these arguments
has been made at different points in the historical efforts to restrict
cluster bomb use; rarely have they been made together. The use of
cluster bombs over the past thirty years has given the international
community ample evidence to support a ban on these weapons.
64
A moratorium on use, production, and transfer of cluster bombs
should be immediately instituted as the first step on the way to a com-
prehensive ban. The United States should take the lead in this endeavor
by implementing a complete moratorium on the use of cluster muni-
tions. It has the opportunity to retake leadership in the area of
conventional weapons in the wake of its decision not to join the Ottawa
Mines Treaty. There are available alternatives to cluster bomb use in the
U.S. arsenal. The humanitarian crisis caused by cluster bombs in coun-
tries unable to bear the burden should be of concern to the United
States, particularly when, as in Kosovo, bombs meant to serve a hu-
manitarian purpose end up killing the very people they were intended to
save.
362. It is encouraging that the U.S. has acknowledged the need for quick and aggres-
sive post-conflict clearance efforts for unexploded cluster munitions, but discouraging that it
failed to live up to this standard in Kosovo. See discussion supra notes 240-241 and accom-
panying text.
363. ICRC, REMNANTS OF WAR, supra note 113.
364. The International Criminal Court also holds promise for the enforcement of an
agreement, whether it include a ban or restrictions. Article 8(2)(b)(xx) of the ICC Statute
makes it a war crime to employ weapons restricted under international humanitarian law.
New restrictions can be added to the list of actionable offenses. ICTY Statute, supra note
150, Art. 8(2)(b)(xx).
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CONCLUSION
Vladimir Jovanovic, a seventy-two-year-old Serb, was injured in a
1999 cluster bomb attack on his home city of Nis, Serbia. He died on
April 4, 2000, some eleven months later, while working in his yard with
a shovel. His shovel accidentally hit a buried cluster bomb that blew up
and killed him.365 His initial injury and subsequent death serve as a mi-
crocosm of the insoluble problems that surround the use and aftermath
of cluster bombs. He was injured in an errant cluster bomb attack in a
civilian area, when a bomblet exploded on contact near him. Months
later, an unexploded cluster bomblet from the same attack took his life.
The injury and death of civilians, in immediate use and subsequently
from unexploded bomblets, were foreseeable.
For the past three decades, efforts to ban cluster bombs have been
thwarted by a combination of military utility, misinformation, and lack
of information. The record has increasingly shown that the immediate
and long term humanitarian impacts of cluster bombs outweigh their
military utility. Alternatives in the form of precision guided munitions
exist. Public awareness and concern over their use has grown in light of
ongoing deaths of civilians long after conflicts in which they have been
used are over. The time has come to ban cluster bombs. The interna-
tional community should not miss the chance.
365. Man Killed in Explosion of Cluster Bomb, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 4, 2000; E-
mail from Bojovic Nikola, Nis, Serbia to Titus Peachey, Peace Education Director, Mennon-
ite Central Committee (MCC April 7, 2000 (on file with author).
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